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IDENTIFYING THE TRADE SECRETS AT ISSUE IN 
LITIGATION UNDER THE UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS 
ACT AND THE FEDERAL DEFEND TRADE SECRETS ACT 
Richard F. Dole, Jr.† 
This article discusses the advantages and disadvantages of 
enabling a defendant to require a plaintiff to identify the trade secrets 
at issue early in the discovery process and protecting a defendant that 
does so from responding to discovery with respect to his or her trade 
secrets until the plaintiff has complied. This approach is fully 
consistent with, if not compelled by, the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 
which has been enacted in forty-seven states, and the federal Defend 
Trade Secrets Act, which became law in May 2016, both of which were 
adopted to facilitate civil actions protecting actual trade secrets. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Trade secret litigation is fact-intensive and often long-lasting. In 
Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entertainment, Inc.,1 a U.S. District Judge awarded 
the successful plaintiff’s attorneys $2,172,000 for approximately 3,620 
hours spent litigating state-law claims of trade secret 
misappropriation.2 This article suggests that it is both efficient and 
desirable to enable defendants to require confidential identification of 
the trade secrets at issue early in the discovery stage of cases under the 
state-adopted Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA)3 and the recently 
enacted federal Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA).4 In order to 
preclude loss of secrecy during litigation, courts routinely issue 
protective orders forbidding unauthorized disclosure of trade secrets5 
and redact their published opinions.6 Both the UTSA and the DTSA 
authorize these and similar precautions to safeguard trade secrets 
during litigation.7 
																																								 																				
 1. Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 801 F. Supp. 2d 950 (C.D. Cal. 2011). 
 2. Id. at 958. A jury awarded the plaintiff $88.5 million dollars in compensatory damages, 
which the trial judge remitted to $85 million dollars. The trial judge awarded the plaintiff an 
additional $85 million dollars in exemplary damages. Id. at 955-56. The litigation was brought 
under the California enactment of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, which authorized recovery of 
compensatory damages, and, in the event of willful and malicious misappropriation, award of 
exemplary damages of up to two times the damages recovered, and recovery of the plaintiff’s 
reasonable attorney’s fees. Id. at 952, 956.  
 3. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, §§1-12, 14 U.L.A. 529-659 (2005), 78-120 (2016 Supp.) 
[hereinafter UTSA]. Judicial decisions under state enactments of the UTSA  are identified in the 
footnotes. 
 4. Defend Trade Secrets Act, Pub. L. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376-386 (2016).  
 5. See, e.g., Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. Dole Food Co., 148 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1326 
(S.D. Fla. 2001) (Florida enactment) (“Once Del Monte specifies this information [identifying the 
trade secrets that it seeks to protect], it can rest assured that the trade secrets will be protected by 
the protective order that is in place in this case.”). 
 6. See, e.g., Global Advanced Metals USA, Inc. v. Kemet Blue Powder Corp., No. 11-
00793, 2013 WL 2319348 at *5 (D. Nev. May 28, 2013) (motions to seal and to redact granted). 
 7. UTSA, supra note 3, § 5, 14. U.L.A. at 647 (“In an action under this [Act], a court shall 
preserve the secrecy of an alleged trade secret by reasonable means, which may include granting 
protective orders in connection with discovery proceedings, holding in-camera hearings, sealing 
the records of the action, and ordering any person involved in the litigation not to disclose an 
alleged trade secret without prior court approval.”); 18 U.S.C. § 1835 (West 2012) (a provision 
of the Economic Espionage Act to which the Defend Trade Secrets Act is an amendment) (“In 
any . . . proceeding under this chapter, the court shall enter such orders and take such other action 
as may be necessary and appropriate to preserve the confidentiality of trade secrets . . . .”). 
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The UTSA was adopted in 1979 and Officially Amended in 19858 
by the Uniform Law Commission (the ULC).9 The ULC reports the 
UTSA as having been enacted in forty-seven states.10 The federal 
DTSA was signed by former President Obama on May 11, 2016 and 
was effective immediately.11 
I.  BACKGROUND OF THE UTSA  
The 1939 Restatement (First) of Torts addressed the definition of 
trade secret in commentary rather than in black-letter text.12 Comment 
b. to Section 757 described a trade secret as follows:   
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation 
of   information which is used in one’s business, and which gives him an 
opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or 
use it. It may be a formula for a chemical compound, a process of 
manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or 
other device, or a list of customers. It differs from other secret information 
in a business…in that it is not simply information as to single or ephemeral 
events in the conduct of the business, as, for example, the amount or other 
terms of a secret bid for a contract or the salary of certain employees, or the 
security investments made or contemplated, or the date fixed for the 
announcement of a new policy or for bringing out a new model or the like. 
A trade secret is a process or device for continuous use in the operation of 
																																								 																				
 8. See UTSA, supra note 3. Four 1985 Amendments were adopted in response to issues 
raised by the American Bar Association Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law. See 
Douglas W. Wyatt, 1981 Summary of Proceedings, 1981 A.B.A. SEC. PAT., TRADEMARK, & 
COPYRIGHT L. PROC. 30-1. The A.B.A. Section recommended amending Section 2(b) to limit 
injunctions allowing future use upon payment of a reasonable royalty to exceptional 
circumstances, amending Section 3 to allow reasonable royalty damages if neither a plaintiff’s 
actual loss nor a defendant’s unjust enrichment were provable, amending Section 7 to make clear 
that state remedies for breach of contract were not preempted, and amending Section 11 to clarify 
that the UTSA did not apply to a continuing misappropriation that began prior to its effective date. 
See id. (Resolutions 206-3 to 206-6). The definition of “trade secret” was not amended in 1985. 
 9. The ULC was organized in 1892 to promote desirable and practicable uniformity in 
state law. Commissioners are appointed by each state, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. 
See 14 U.L.A. III-IV (2005) (preface). 
 10. Legislative Fact Sheet – Trade Secrets Act, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION (2017), 
http://bit.do/LegisFactSheetTSA. The Act has yet to be adopted in Massachusetts, New York, and 
North Carolina but has been enacted in the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin 
Islands. Id. Widespread enactment of the UTSA has been a factor in the increasing importance of 
trade secret law. David S. Almeling, Seven Reasons Why Trade Secrets Are Increasingly 
Important, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1091, 1106 (2012) (“[W]idespread adoption of the UTSA 
has increased awareness of trade secret law – among lawyers, companies, judges, and others – 
and has provided greater consistency in the application of trade secret law . . . .”). 
 11. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, PUB. L. 114-153, § 2(e), 130 Stat. 376, 381 (2016) 
(the Act is effective on the date of enactment). 
 12. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS, § 757, cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1939) [hereinafter 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST)]. 
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the business . . . . The subject matter of a trade secret must be secret.13 
Comment b. also identified six factors relevant to whether 
information was a trade secret:  
Some factors to be considered in determining whether given information is 
one’s trade secret are: (1) the extent to which the information is known 
outside of his business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees 
and others involved in his business; (3) the extent of measures taken by him 
to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the information to 
him and to his competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended by 
him in developing the information; (6) the ease or difficulty with which the 
information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others.14 
The Restatement (First) prefaced the six factors with the 
statement: “An exact definition of a trade secret is not possible.”15 A 
plaintiff did not have to satisfy all six factors in order to prove that a 
trade secret existed.16   
The open-endedness of the Restatement (First) approach led some 
courts to infer the existence of a trade secret from the defendant’s 
improper acquisition or improper use of confidential information. In 
the 1953 decision Franke v. Wiltschek,17 for example, citing inter alia 
the Restatement (First),18 the Second Circuit affirmed a permanent 
injunction against the defendants’ manufacture and sale of a competing 
product as well as an accounting of the defendants’ profits.19  Because 
the defendants had obtained the information from the plaintiffs by 
feigning willingness to market their product, the Second Circuit panel 
																																								 																				
 13. Id.  
 14. Id. The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition does not endorse the Restatement 
(First) factors. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 39, cmt d at 430 (AM. 
LAW INST. 1995) (Supp. 2016) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF UNFAIR COMPETITION] (“It is not 
possible to state precise criteria for determining the existence of a trade secret. The status of 
information claimed as a trade secret must be ascertained through a comparative evaluation of all 
the relevant factors, including the value, secrecy, and definiteness of the information as well as 
the nature of the defendant’s misconduct.”). 
 15. RESTATEMENT (FIRST), supra note 12, at 6. 
 16. Learning Curve Toys, Inc. v. Playwood Toys, Inc., 342 F.3d 714, 722 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(Illinois enactment) (“[W]e do not construe the foregoing factors as a six-part test, in which the 
absence of evidence on any single factor necessarily preludes a finding of trade secret 
protection.”); IVS Hydro, Inc. v. Robinson, 93 Fed. Appx. 521, 526-27 (4th Cir. 2004) (per 
curiam)(West Virginia enactment) Wisconsin initially considered that all six Restatement (First) 
factors had to be proved for a trade secret to exist. However, enactment of the UTSA in Wisconsin 
transformed the Restatement (First) factors from mandatory requirements into helpful guides. 
Minuteman, Inc. v. Alexander, 434 N.W.2d 773, 778 (1989) (“We hold that although all six 
elements of the Restatement’s test are no longer  required, the Restatement requirements still 
provide helpful guidance in deciding whether certain materials are trade secrets under our new 
definition.”). 
 17. Franke v. Wiltschek, 209 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1953). 
 18. Id. at 495. 
 19. Franke v. Wiltschek, 115 F. Supp. 28, 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). 
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dismissed as irrelevant the evidence that the information was available 
from an expired patent and from the plaintiffs’ publicly marketed 
product.20 The court considered that the defendants’ improper 
commercial conduct outweighed the lack of secrecy of the information 
at issue. 
II.  THE UTSA 
A. The UTSA Definition of Trade Secret 
The UTSA was developed to fill the gap created by the omission 
of trade secrets from the Restatement (Second) of Torts.21 Section 1(4) 
defines a trade secret as follows: 
 “Trade secret” means information, including a formula, pattern, 
compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process that: 
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from 
not being generally known to, and not being readily 
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can 
obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and  
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the 
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.22 
This definition omits the Restatement (First) requirement that a 
trade secret be “for continuous use.”23 Under the UTSA, a trade secret 
																																								 																				
 20. Franke, 209 F.2d at 494-95. The Second Circuit panel was unanimous with respect to 
the defendants’ liability. But Judge Frank dissented from the majority’s affirming the grant of 
injunctive relief. Id. at 503-07. For a similar dictum by Mr. Justice Holmes that preceded the 
Restatement (First), see E. I. DuPont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 
(1917) (“Whether the plaintiffs have any secret or not the defendant knows the facts, whatever 
they are, through a special confidence that he accepted. The property may be denied but the 
confidence cannot be. Therefore the starting point for the present matter is not property or due 
process of law, but that the defendant stood in confidential relations with the plaintiffs, or one of 
them.”). 
 21. Richard F. Dole, Jr., Preemption of Other State Law by the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 
17 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 95, 97-98 (2014) [hereinafter Dole, Preemption]. See 4 
Restatement Torts (Second) at 1-2 (1979) (stating that trade secret law had become independent 
of tort law). Professor Robert Bone has proposed replacement of the traditional trade secret law 
reflected in the UTSA with a regime limited to enforcement of contracts and traditional torts, 
perhaps combined with recognition of new property rights conditioned upon public disclosure of 
the information that traditional trade secret law protects only if kept secret. Robert G. Bone, An 
Essay on the Limits of Trade Secret Law, in LAW, INFO. & INFO. TECH. 99 (Eli Lederman & Ron 
Shapira eds. Kluwer Law Int’l 2001).  
 22. UTSA, supra note 3, § 1(4). This definition reduces “the inconsistency in case law that 
naturally flowed from the Restatement (First) of Torts’ indeterminate list of trade secrecy factors.” 
Sharon K. Sandeen, A Contract by Any Other Name is Still a Contract: Examining the 
Effectiveness of Trade Secret Clauses to Protect Databases, 45 IDEA 119, 130 (2005) [hereinafter 
Sandeen, Databases]. 
 23. See supra note  13 and accompanying text. 
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can exist before information has been commercialized.24 A negative 
trade secret also can exist in research proving that a particular approach 
does not work.25 Both the 1995 Restatement of Unfair Competition,26 
and the 2015 Restatement of Employment Law27 follow this UTSA 
departure from the Restatement (First).28 
 The UTSA definition has three aspects. The preamble is a 
nonexclusive list of the forms in which a trade secret can appear. The 
list tracks Comment b. to Section 757 of the Restatement (First) with 
the addition of “program,” “method,” and “technique” and the 
omission of “list of customers.”29 Because the list is not exclusive, 
neither the additions nor the omission determine the information that 
can be a trade secret.30 
																																								 																				
 24. UTSA, supra note 3, § 1, cmt., 14 U.L.A. at 538. E.g., Learning Curve Toys, 342 F.3d 
at 716-20, 727, 730-31 (Illinois enactment) (jury verdict for toy designer against toy manufacturer 
reinstated with respect to misappropriation of the plaintiff’s design for a  noise-producing toy 
train track that the plaintiff had not manufactured); Olson v. Nieman’s, Ltd., 579 N.W.2d 299, 
303-04, 314 (Iowa 1998) (Iowa enactment) (potential economic value of inventor’s idea shown 
by evidence that several manufacturers were interested in it). The UTSA’s application to ideas 
that have not been commercialized provides a remedy for idea submitters. See generally Robert 
C. Denicola, The New Law of Ideas, 28 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 195, 198-203, 225-30, 236 (2014). 
 25. UTSA, supra note 3, § 1, cmt., 14 U.L.A. at 538; accord, RESTATEMENT OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION, supra note 14, § 39, cmt. ([the rejected “use” requirement] “places in doubt 
protection for so-called ‘negative’ information that teaches conduct to be avoided….”). But see 
Amir H. Khoury, The Case Against the Protection of Negative Trade Secrets: Sisyphus’ 
Entrepreneurship, 54 IDEA 431, 467-75 (2014) (arguing for a negative information defense to 
trade secret misappropriation involving a final product so that research failures need not be 
wastefully duplicated by competitors).  
 26. See RESTATEMENT OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 14, § 39. 
 27. RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 8.02 (2015) (definition of employer’s trade 
secret) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF EMP. LAW]. The significance of this new Restatement is 
indicated by a statistical analysis of 394 cases in which a federal district court issued a written 
opinion dealing with trade secrets between 1950 and 2008. In over 85% of the cases, the alleged 
misappropriator was either a former employee or a former business partner of the plaintiff. David 
S. Almeling, Darin W. Snyder, Michael Sapoznikow, Whitney E. McCollum & Jill Weader, A 
Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in the Federal Courts, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 291, 293, 
302-03 (2010). 
 28. RESTATEMENT OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 14, § 39, cmt. d at 429-30 
(discussing abandonment of the for continuous use requirement). The Restatement of 
Employment Law definition of “employer’s trade secret” contains no reference to “for continuous 
use.”  See RESTATEMENT OF EMP. LAW, supra note 27, § 8.02. Also comment a. to § 8.02 states 
that the definition is consistent with both the UTSA and the Restatement of Unfair Competition. 
Id. cmt. a. at 406.  
 29. Compare supra note 22 and accompanying text with supra note  13 and accompanying 
text. 
 30. See American Paper & Packaging Prods., Inc. v. Kirgan, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1318, 1323-
24 (2d Dist. 1986) (California enactment) (“We cannot agree with respondents’ argument that the 
Legislature’s failure to include customer lists in its definition of trade secrets represents an 
intentional exclusion of same. The very language of Civil Code 3426.1, subdivision (d), is 
inclusive, not exclusive.”). 
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Subsection (i) requires that a trade secret derive “actual or 
potential independent economic value” from “not being generally 
known to, or readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons 
who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use.”31 
Independent economic value” derived from secrecy can be shown by 
proof of both actual or potential value and secrecy.32 The 1995 
Restatement of Unfair Competition, for example, paraphrases the 
UTSA definition as including “any information that . . . is sufficiently 
valuable and secret to afford an actual or a potential economic 
advantage over others.”33 
States have enacted a number of non-uniform amendments to the 
UTSA definition.34 Except in Nebraska, however, the non-uniform 
amendments are not of major import.35 
The UTSA is best understood as an intellectual property statute 
that encourages the development of valuable new information through 
recognition of limited exclusive rights.36 The UTSA contains an 
elaborate definition of “misappropriation,”37 which makes the 
existence of a trade secret a prerequisite.38 Misappropriation cannot 
exist if no trade secret exists,39 and actual or threatened 
																																								 																				
 31. UTSA, supra note 3, § 1(4) (i), 14 U.L.A. at 538. 
 32. See, e.g., Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 901 (Minn. 
1983) (Minnesota enactment) (“[T]he [trial] court cited the time and money that ECC reasonably 
expended in developing its motors. That ECC expended time and money between 1966 and 1975 
in the development of the 1125 motor and its predecessors does not support a finding of 
competitive advantage unless, under the present state of the art, a prospective competitor could 
not produce a comparable motor without a similar expenditure of time and money. The trial court 
found…that such time and money would be required of a prospective competitor today . . . . The 
ECC 1125, therefore, did provide ECC with economic value from its secrecy . . . .”).  
 33. RESTATEMENT OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 14, § 39 at 425. 
 34. For discussion of the non-uniform amendments and their significance, see Richard F. 
Dole, Jr., Contours of American Trade Secret Law: What is and What Isn’t Protectable as a Trade 
Secret, 19 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 89, 96-101 (2016). 
 35. See id. 
 36. See generally Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP 
Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311 (2008) [hereinafter Lemley, IP Rights]; but see Charles Tait Graves, 
Trade Secrets as Property: Theory and Consequences, 15 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 39, 80-84 (2007) 
(trade secret rights are best justified by the infrastructural nexus that a business provides for 
creativity). 
 37. UTSA, supra note 3, § 1(2), 14 U.L.A. at 537. 
 38. E.g., id. § 1(2) (i) (“Misappropriation” means (i) acquisition of a trade secret of another 
. . . .”). 
 39. E.g., Calisi v. Unified Fin. Servs., LLC, 232 Ariz. 103, 106, 302 P.3d 628, 631 (Ariz. 
App. 2013) (Arizona enactment) (“To establish a claim for misappropriation of a trade secret, the 
claimant must first prove a legally protectable trade secret exists.”) (superior court judgment on 
trade secret counterclaim vacated due to former employer’s failure to prove that it had a legally 
protectable trade secret); Electro-Craft Corp., 332 N.W.2d at 897 (“Without a proven trade secret 
there can be no action for misappropriation, even if defendants’ actions were wrongful.”) 
(Minnesota enactment). As Professor Sharon Sandeen has observed, the UTSA “was designed to 
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misappropriation must exist for a remedy for misappropriation to be 
available.40 If trade secret rights are not involved, a plaintiff’s tort 
remedy for theft of its personal property is conversion, not trade secret 
misappropriation.41 
However, a Comment to the 1995 Restatement of Unfair 
Competition states: 
Because of the public interest in deterring the acquisition of information by 
improper means, doubts regarding the status of information as a trade secret 
are likely to be resolved in favor of protection when the means of 
acquisition are clearly improper.42 
The Reporters’ Note to the Comment cites the two cases discussed 
below.43  
The first case, Tan-Line Sun Studios, Inc. v. Bradley44 was a 1986 
decision in a federal court diversity action applying the Pennsylvania 
courts’ adoption of the 1939 Restatement of Torts (First) principles of 
trade secret misappropriation. The plaintiff operated and franchised 
tanning salons. The defendants were a consultant, who initially had 
provided advice concerning franchisee financing to the plaintiff, the 
consultant’s wife, and several investors who had opened four 
competing tanning salons. A trial judge sitting without a jury declared 
that the plaintiff’s “entire methodology for conducting a tanning 
studio” was a trade secret.45  Furthermore,  
Because I find that a confidential relationship existed, and because I find 
that Mr. Bradley used the trade secrets in a manner that breached the 
confidential relationship, Bradley is liable for his unlawful acquisition and 
																																								 																				
re-focus attention on the character of the thing to be protected and, thereby, limit the cases in 
which a successful trade secret claim can be brought.”  Sandeen, Databases, supra note 22, at 
129. 
 40. See, e.g., UTSA, supra note 3, §§ 2-3 (misappropriation must exist to recover damages 
and actual or threatened misappropriation must exist to be granted injunctive relief); Electro-Craft 
Corp., 332 N.W.2d at 897 (“[W]ithout the finding of a trade secret, we cannot grant relief to 
ECC.”). However, a defendant can be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees if a plaintiff has claimed 
that misappropriation existed in bad faith. See UTSA, supra note 3, § 4(i), 14 U.L.A. at 642. 
 41. E.g., Hecny Transp., Inc. v. Chu, 430 F.3d 402, 403-405 (7th Cir. 2005) (Illinois 
enactment) (theft of equipment is actionable [conversion] without a trade secret). 
 42. RESTATEMENT OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 14, § 43, cmt. d, at 496. See also 
id., § 39, cmt. d, at 430 (“the nature of the defendant’s misconduct” is a factor in whether a trade 
secret exists). The 2015 Restatement of Employment Law, which also purports to be consistent 
with the UTSA definition of trade secret, does not reaffirm this. See RESTATEMENT OF EMP. LAW, 
supra note 27, § 8.02, cmt. a, at 406. 
 43. RESTATEMENT OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 14, § 43, at 498. 
 44. Tan-Line Sun Studios, Inc. v. Bradley, No. 84-5925, 1986 WL 3764 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 
1986), aff’d sub nom Paul v. Tanning, Health, & Fitness Equip. Co., 808 F.2d 1517, 1517-18 (3d 
Cir. 1986) (table). 
 45. Id. at 7. 
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use of the trade secrets.46  
In other words, Tan-Line is like the Second Circuit Franke v. 
Wiltschek case discussed earlier,47 a decision that utilized the 
Restatement (First)’s open-ended definition of trade secret to punish 
unsavory commercial behavior as trade secret misappropriation. In 
view of the fact that the trial judge also found all the defendants liable 
for fraud and for participating in Mr. Bradley’s breach of the duty of 
loyalty to the plaintiff,48 the trade secret discussion in Tan-Line was 
dicta. 
The second case, Clark v. Bunker49 was a 1972 decision in a 
federal court diversity action applying the Nevada courts’ adoption of 
the 1939 Restatement (First) trade secret principles. The facts were 
opaque but the analysis was clear. The Ninth Circuit panel stated: 
“Liability is predicated on communication of the secret to the defendant 
in confidence and disclosure or unauthorized use of the information by 
the defendant.”50  The panel emphasized: “the extreme and unlawful 
means appellants employed to secure those details—including 
concealment, affirmative misrepresentation, and commercial 
espionage.”51 
 Like Tan-Line, Clark v. Bunker utilized the Restatement (First)’s 
open-ended definition of “trade secret” to punish distasteful 
commercial conduct as trade secret misappropriation. The 1995 
Restatement of Unfair Competition Comment sums up these two cases 
reasonably accurately but the cases and the Restatement of Unfair 
Competition Comment do not illustrate how the cases should be 
resolved under the UTSA, which requires the existence of a trade secret 
for misappropriation to be possible,52 and for a remedy for 
misappropriation to be available.53 
The indispensability of a trade secret to the existence of 
misappropriation and the availability of a remedy for misappropriation 




 46. Id. at 9. 
 47. Refer to notes  17-20 and accompanying text. 
 48. Tan-Line, 1986 WL at *10-12. 
 49. Clark v. Bunker, 453 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1972). 
 50. Id. at 1008 n.2. 
 51. Id. at 1010. 
 52. Refer to the authorities supra notes  37-39 and accompanying text. 
 53. Refer to the authorities supra note  40 and accompanying text.  
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B. Litigating Trade Secret Misappropriation Under the UTSA 
The UTSA does not alter a state’s pleading rules.54 Discovery 
rules are another matter.55 
1. The CUTSA Early Disclosure Rule 
At first blush California is a unique case. In conjunction with its 
enactment of the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act (CUTSA) in 
1985, the California state legislature adopted a special discovery 
requirement that is now California Code of Civil Procedure § 
2019.210: 
In any action alleging the misappropriation of a trade secret under the 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act…before commencing discovery relating to the 
trade secret, the party alleging the misappropriation shall identify the trade 
secret with reasonable particularity subject to any court orders that may be 
appropriate under [the Section dealing with preservation of the secrecy of a 
trade secret in judicial proceedings] . . . .56  
																																								 																				
 54. See the authority in supra note 3. See, e.g., Automed Techs., Inc. v. Eller, 160 F. Supp. 
2d 915, 920-921 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (Illinois enactment) (“[T]rade secrets need not be disclosed in 
detail in a complaint alleging misappropriation….”); Savor, Inc. v. FMR Corp., 812 A.2d 894, 
897 (Del. 2002) (Delaware enactment) (“Appellees say that the Savor Program cannot be a trade 
secret because it is nothing but a combination of widely known business and marketing techniques 
associated with rebate programs . . . . The short answer to these arguments is that, at this stage of 
the proceedings, Savor gets the benefit of all favorable inferences.”) (reversing dismissal of third 
amended complaint for failure to identify trade secret with sufficient particularity); Compuware 
Corp. v. Int’l Bus. Mach., 259 F. Supp. 2d 597, 605 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (“While Compuware has 
not identified its trade secrets ‘clearly, unambiguously, and with specificity,’ such is not necessary 
at the pleading stage. The court finds that Compuware’s allegations give adequate notice of its 
cause of action to IBM. Any further specificity desired by IBM can be achieved through discovery 
. . . . For the reasons set forth above, defendant’s motion to dismiss and for a more definite 
statement is DENIED.”). 
 55. See Kevin R. Casey, Identification of Trade Secrets During Discovery: Timing and 
Specificity, 24 AIPLA Q.J. 191, 259 (1996) (“[A] federal district court would likely require . . . 
[identification of] the allegedly misappropriated trade secrets with ‘reasonable particularity’ near 
the start of discovery.”); Charles Tait Graves & Brian D. Range, Identification of Trade Secret 
Claims in Litigation: Solutions for a Ubiquitous Dispute, 5 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 68, 97 
(2006) [hereinafter Graves & Range, Identification] (“[C]ourts in jurisdictions that have not yet 
enacted a pre-discovery identification requirement for trade secret cases should do so, both as a 
valuable case management process and to encourage pre-lawsuit investigations.”). 
 56. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 2019.210 (West 2007) & (2016 Supp.). The special California  
statute does not apply to the pleading stage of litigation. Meggitt San Juan Capistrano, Inc. v. 
Yongzhong, 575 Fed. Appx. 801, 803 (9th Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (the special California  statute 
does not apply to pleadings). A Wisconsin non-uniform amendment requires greater specificity 
in another context. The Wisconsin enactment of the UTSA requires that an application for an 
injunction or a restraining order include “a description of each alleged trade secret in sufficient 
detail to inform the party to be enjoined or restrained of the nature of the complaint against that 
party or, if the court so orders, includes written disclosure of the trade secret.”  WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§134.90(3)(a) (West 2016) (Wisconsin enactment). 
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The Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Section of the California 
State Bar recommended requiring identification of the alleged trade 
secrets at issue prior to discovery with respect to trade secrets.57 The 
initial bill required the identification of trade secrets “with 
particularity.” The qualifier “reasonable” was added during the 
legislative process.58   
The special statute was inspired by the opinion in Diodes, Inc. v. 
Franzen.59 In Diodes, the plaintiff corporation had alleged that two 
former directors and officers, who also had been salaried employees, 
had participated in forming a competitor and misappropriating the 
plaintiff’s “secret process.”60 In affirming the trial court’s dismissal of 
the third amended complaint, a California intermediate appellate court 
commented in dicta: 
Before a defendant is compelled to respond to a complaint based upon 
claimed misappropriation or misuse of a trade secret and to embark on 
discovery which may be both prolonged and expensive, the complainant 
should describe the subject matter of the trade secret with sufficient 
particularity to separate it from matters of general knowledge in the trade 
or of special knowledge of those persons who are skilled in the trade, and 
to permit the defendant to ascertain at least the boundaries within which the 
secret lies.61  
Thus, the special California  statute requires plaintiffs to identify trade 
secrets at the discovery stage62 in order to encourage pre-suit 
investigation and to narrow the scope and cost of discovery in trade 
secret cases.63 To comply with this requirement, California plaintiffs 
																																								 																				
 57. Computer Econ., Inc. v. Gartner Group, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 980, 984-985 (S.D. Cal. 
1999) (“[The statute] was intended to…afford a measure of protection against the procedure of 
initiating an action to pursue extensive discovery without revelation of the trade secret or 
secrets.”). A California State Bar Association Memorandum sent to the legislature stated in part: 
One area not addressed by the UTSA is the area of plaintiff’s abuse in initiating trade secret 
lawsuits for the purpose of harassing or even driving a competitor out of business by forcing a 
competitor to spend large sums in defending unwarranted litigation. Id. at n.6. 
 58. James H. Pooley, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act: California Civil Code 3426, 1 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 193, 215 (1985) [hereinafter Pooley, UTSA]. 
 59. Diodes, Inc. v. Franzen, 260 Cal. App. 2d 244, 67 Cal. Rptr. 19 (2d Dist. 1968); see 
Computer Econ., 50 F. Supp.2d at 984 (“The rationale behind . . . [the special statute] was first 
articulated in Diodes, Inc. v. Franzen . . . .”). 
 60. Diodes, 260 Cal. App. 2d at 249-50. 
 61. Id. at 253. 
 62. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.  Suggesting that the California statute can 
be satisfied by an identification that would be appropriate in a complaint because it was inspired 
by Diodes, which involved the adequacy of a complaint, is inaccurate.  Contra JAMES POOLEY, 
TRADE SECRETS § 11.02[2][b] n.18.4 (2016) (“[I]mplementing the Diodes…decision [the special 
statute] requires only that the plaintiff’s statement provide an initial level of specificity 
appropriate to a complaint . . . .”) [hereinafter POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS].          
 63. Pooley, UTSA, supra note 58, at 203.  
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typically file a Trade Secret Disclosure Statement identifying their 
trade secrets.64 
Advanced Modular Sputtering, Inc. v. Superior Court65 was the 
first substantive appellate construction of the special statute. The 
Second District Court of Appeals identified four goals:  
First, it promotes well-investigated claims and dissuades the filing of 
meritless trade secret complaints. Second, it prevents plaintiffs from using 
the discovery process as a means to obtain the defendant’s trade secrets . . . 
. Third, the rule assists the court in framing the appropriate scope of 
discovery and in determining whether plaintiff’s discovery requests fall 
within that scope . . . . Fourth, it enables defendants to form complete and 
well-reasoned defenses, ensuring that they need not wait until the eve of 
trial to effectively defend against charges of trade secret misappropriation.66 
The same intermediate appellate court later emphasized that the two 
most important goals of the statute were to aid the courts in guiding 
discovery and to facilitate defendants’ formulation of defenses.67 After 
the alleged trade secrets at issue have been identified, for example, both 
sides’ expert reports can be more focused and useful.68 
Perlan Therapeutics, Inc. v. Superior Court,69 a 2010 California 
intermediate appellate court case, involved the adequacy of the 
plaintiff’s amended Trade Secret Disclosure Statement.70 After 
reviewing the prevailing appellate constructions of the special statute, 
the court denied the plaintiff’s application for a writ of mandate 
requiring acceptance of the amended Disclosure Statement.71 The court 
observed that the statute does not require either the “greatest degree of 
particularity possible” or a “miniature trial on the merits of a 
misappropriation claim before discovery can commence.”72 A plaintiff 
must indicate how its alleged trade secret differs from publicly 
																																								 																				
 64. See, e.g., Perlan Therapeutics, Inc. v. Superior Court, 178 Cal. App. 4th 1333, 1337-38 
(rev. den. 1st Dist. 2010) (plaintiff filed a Trade Secret Disclosure Statement to comply with the 
California special statute). 
 65. 132 Cal. App. 4th 826 (rev. den. 2d Dist. 2005). 
 66. Id. at 833-34. 
 67. Brescia v. Angelin, 172 Cal. App. 4th 133, 149-50 (2d Dist. 2009). 
 68. Graves & Range, Identification, supra note 55, at 75 (“Without an exact identification, 
the plaintiff’s expert may simply declare that broad areas of technology are trade secrets . . . . 
Meanwhile, the defense experts may be forced to spend a great deal of effort researching and 
opining on wider areas of technology than are at issue . . . .”). 
 69. 178 Cal. App. 4th at 1333. 
 70. Id. at 1338-39 (description of the plaintiff’s amended Trade Secret Disclosure 
Statement). 
 71. Id. at 1354. 
 72. Id. at 1346. 
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available knowledge but is not required to convince the court as a fact 
finder that the information is in fact secret.73 
a. The Effect of the CUTSA Nonuniform 
Amendments to the Definition of Trade Secret 
California’s nonuniform amendments to the UTSA definition of 
“trade secret” affect the identification required by the special statute. 
Under the UTSA, sufficient secrecy requires that information be 
neither generally known to, nor readily ascertainable by proper means 
by, others who can obtain value from its disclosure or use.74  However, 
a California nonuniform amendment states that a trade secret also must 
not be generally known to “the public.”75 A second California 
nonuniform amendment makes the ready ascertainability of 
information by proper means an affirmative defense to 
misappropriation.76 In Brescia v. Angelin,77 for example, a trial court 
determination requiring a cross-suit plaintiff  to describe how its 
pudding formula and manufacturing process were distinguishable from 
matters known to skilled persons in the commercial food industry was 
reversed. A California intermediate appellate court held that it was 
necessary to show that either the court otherwise could not determine 
the scope of discovery or the defendant otherwise could not articulate 
defenses to require a plaintiff to explain how alleged trade secrets 
differed from what was known in the industry.78 
The California nonuniform amendments influenced the 
distinction drawn in Brescia between information known to the general 
public and information known to those in the industry.79  Under the 
official text of the UTSA, the Brescia trial court order should not have 
been reversed but rather expanded to require explanation of how the 
alleged trade secrets were distinguishable from information that was 
readily ascertainable to those in the industry.80 
																																								 																				
 73. See id. at 1351-52.  
 74. UTSA, supra note 3, § 1(4)(i), 14 U.L.A. at 538. 
 75. Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.1(d) (West 1997) (Supp. 2015). 
 76. Id. (deleting  lack of ready ascertainability by proper means from the definition of trade 
secret). The effect of this deletion is to make the ready ascertainability of information by proper 
means an affirmative defense to misappropriation in California. See Pooley, UTSA, supra note 
58, at 197-99. 
 77. Brescia, 172 Cal. App. 4th at 149. 
 78. Id. at 149-50. 
 79. See supra notes  75-76 and accompanying text. 
 80. See IDX Sys. Corp. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 165 F. Supp. 2d 812, 817 (W.D. Wisc. 2001) 
(Wisconsin enactment) (“[T]he description must be specific enough to allow the meaningful 
comparison of the putative trade secret with information that is generally known and ascertainable 
in the relevant field or industry.”), rev’d in part on other grounds, 285 F.3d 581, 583-84 (7th Cir. 
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b. Applicability of the CUTSA Early Disclosure 
Rule in Diversity Cases 
The Ninth Circuit has yet to rule whether the special California  
statute applies in federal diversity jurisdiction cases. The California 
federal district courts are divided on the question,81 but the better view 
is that the special California statute should apply in diversity cases. The 
special statute does not conflict with the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and failure to apply it would encourage plaintiffs with weak 
trade secret claims to file in California federal court rather than in 
California state court.82  
The special statute is limited to discovery with respect to trade 
secret misappropriation.83  It has no effect upon the initial general 
disclosures required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 84 and 
discovery with respect to other substantive legal claims.85 
																																								 																				
2002). 
 81. Loop AI Labs, Inc. v. Gatti, No. 15-00798, 2015 WL 9269758 at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 
21, 2015) (unpublished) (applying the special California  statute in a diversity case 
notwithstanding a conflicting holding in the Eastern District of California).  
 82. Under the Erie doctrine, in diversity cases federal courts must apply state substantive 
law and federal procedural law. Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 
(1996) (“Under the Erie doctrine, federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law 
and federal procedural law.”). The test for substantive state law is whether the state law would 
have so important an effect upon the rights of one or both parties that a failure to apply it either 
would unfairly discriminate against citizens of the forum state or would be likely to cause a 
plaintiff to choose a federal court. Id. at 428. Computer Economics, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 986-92 
(explaining in detail why the California statute does not conflict with the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and is substantive for Erie purposes). 
 83. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. See also Mediostream, Inc. v. Microsoft 
Corp., 749 F. Supp. 2d 507, 517 (E.D. Tex. 2010) (“[T]he rule does not require that a party identify 
the trade secret before discovery in general begins. Rather, by its plain language, the rule requires 
that the trade secret be identified ‘before commencing discovery related to the trade secret.”) 
(quoting Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 2019.210).  
 84. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require automatic initial disclosure of individuals 
likely to have discoverable information that the disclosing party may use to support claims or 
defenses, copies or descriptions by category and location of documents and tangible things that 
the disclosing party has in its possession and may use to support claims or defenses, computations 
of damages and other monetary relief claimed, and insurance agreements that could be used to 
satisfy a judgment or to reimburse satisfaction of a judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 26(a)(1). In 
order to avoid any conflict, a California federal district court should delay implantation of the 
special statute until the initial disclosures mandated by Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 26(a)(1) have been 
made. Computer Economics, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 990 n.10 (“To the extent the material compelled 
by Rule 26(a) overlaps with the material precluded from discovery under CCP § 2019(d), the 
court could simply delay operation of the state statute until the defendant has discharged the 
obligations imposed by Rule 26(a).”) (dictum). Although Computer Economics was decided 
before the 2000 amendments to Rule 26(a)(1), this remains good advice. The fundamental 
consistency of California’s special statute with the Federal Rules is demonstrated by the decisions 
reaching the same result under the Federal Rules. See, e.g., infra notes  86-92 and accompanying 
text. 
 85. See Loop AI Labs v. Gatti, 195 F. Supp. 3d 1107, 1110 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 6, 2016)  
484 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.   [Vol. 33 
2. Early Disclosure of Trade Secrets under 
Enactments of UTSA in Other States 
To what extent is experience under the special California statute 
relevant in other states that have enacted the UTSA? This was 
addressed in Vesta Corp. v. Amdocs Management Ltd.,86 a 2015 Oregon 
federal diversity case. In Vesta, the defendants in a trade secret 
misappropriation case moved for an order compelling the plaintiff’s 
responses to interrogatories requiring identification of the allegedly 
misappropriated trade secrets with reasonable particularity and also for 
a protective order excusing the defendants from responding to 
discovery requests on the topic until the plaintiff reasonably had 
identified its trade secrets. The plaintiff objected that the defendants 
essentially were invoking the special California  statute, which did not 
apply to the case. The federal trial judge responded that the “reasonable 
particularity” standard for identification of trade secrets was the 
“growing consensus” of federal courts under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and granted both the order to compel and the protective 
order.87 After discovery had commenced, by granting motions for an 
order compelling identification of the plaintiff’s alleged trade secrets 
and a companion order excusing the defendants from responding to 
requests about trade secrets until the plaintiff had complied, Vesta 
reached a result comparable to that required by the special California  
																																								 																				
(California statute) (denying IQS’s motion to stay all discovery, but granting a stay of discovery 
as to Plaintiff’s CUTSA claim until such time that Plaintiff filed a statement “identifying with 
reasonable particularity the trade secrets at issue in this lawsuit.”). 
 86. Vesta Corp. v. Amdocs Management Ltd., 147 F. Supp. 3d 1147 (D. Ore. 2015); accord 
Del Monte Fresh Produce, 148 F. Supp. 2d at 1324 (“Although Florida has not enacted a statute 
like California’s that compels disclosure of trade secrets, the same result is achieved under 
Florida’s case law.”). 
 87. Vesta, 147 F. Supp. 3d at 1151, 1153-54, 1158; accord Del Monte Fresh Produce, 148 
F. Supp. 2d at 1325-26 (granting the defendant’s motion to compel the plaintiff to identify its 
trade secrets with reasonable particularity); Big Vision Private, Ltd. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours 
& Co., 1 F. Supp. 3d 224, 258 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“While the Second Circuit has not explicitly 
adopted this requirement [the necessity of a plaintiff’s identification of its trade secrets], each 
Circuit Court of Appeals to have opined on this issue has required a comparable degree of 
specificity, as have numerous district courts across the country.”), aff’d on other grounds, Big 
Vision Private, Ltd. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 610 Fed. Appx. 69 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(unpublished). See also Tucson Embedded Sys., Inc. v. Turbine Powered Tech., LLC, No. 14-
01868, 2016 WL 1408347 at *7 (D. Ariz. Apr. 11, 2016) (unpublished) (the Arizona discovery 
process includes the issue addressed by the special California  statute). 
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statute.88 Moreover, in StoneEagle Services, Inc. v. Valentine,89  a 2013 
case, a federal magistrate relied on federal case law and the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure to grant the defendants’ motion for an order 
requiring identification of the plaintiff’s allegedly misappropriated 
trade secrets even though the defendants had not served interrogatories 
requesting identification.90 
As Vesta illustrates, there are multiple rationales for enabling a 
defendant to require a plaintiff to identify allegedly misappropriated 
trade secrets early in pretrial discovery. These rationales are influenced 
by the reality that a plaintiff ordinarily can identify its own trade secrets 
from its own documents, records, and witnesses.91 Discovery of the 
defendant’s documents, records, and witnesses is primarily necessary 
to prove misappropriation and damages.92  
As an intellectual property statute, the UTSA requires the 
existence of one or more trade secrets to justify its invocation.93 Not 
																																								 																				
 88. A single order requiring identification of the plaintiff’s alleged trade secrets before the 
plaintiff can commence discovery with respect to trade secrets has the same effect. See, e.g., 
United Services Automobile Ass’n v. Mitek Systems, Inc., 289 F.R.D. 244, 246, 249 (W.D. TX), 
aff’d, No. 12-282, 2013 WL 1867417 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 24, 2013)  (unpublished) (a federal 
magistrate granted the defendant’s motion requiring “pre-discovery identification” of plaintiff’s 
trade secrets before the plaintiff could commence discovery on its trade secret claims). 
 89. No. 12-1687, 2013 WL 9554563 (N.D. Tex. Jun. 5, 2013)  (unpublished). 
 90. Id. at 3 (“To the extent that the Fifth Circuit has not yet addressed this issue, the 
undersigned finds support for the ruling based on the above-referenced case law and the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.”). The magistrate was influenced by the fact that the parties were 
involved in another case with the same issues in which discovery had been served, responded to, 
and a motion to compel was pending. The parties had agreed to share the discovery in the two 
cases. Id. at 4. The StoneEagle order was followed by another federal magistrate in a case not 
involving multiple litigation between the parties. Zenimax Media, Inc. v. Oculus Vr, Inc., No. 14-
1849, 2015 WL 1120582 at *3 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2015)  (unpublished) (“StoneEagle does not 
conclude that Plaintiffs should receive some discovery pertaining to their trade secret claims prior 
to  being ordered to identify those claims with reasonable particularity”) (emphasis added). See 
also United Services Automobile Ass’n, 289 F.R.D. at 246, 248-49 (federal magistrate required 
the plaintiff to identify its trade secrets prior to commencing discovery with respect to its trade 
secret claims). 
 91. See Graves & Range, Identification, supra note 55, at 73 (“[T]he plaintiff’s 
identification of its own alleged intellectual property does not depend upon the defendant’s 
documents . . . .”). The principal exception would involve a former employee’s destruction of all 
his or her former employer’s records with respect to a misappropriated trade secret. See infra 
notes 117, 119 and accompanying text. A plaintiff should have to identify both the facts giving it 
exclusive rights in information and why the information is solely in the possession of the 
defendant in order to be excused from identification due to these circumstances. See infra notes 
117, 119 and accompanying text. 
 92. See Loop AI Labs, 2016 WL 3654378 at *6 (“Plaintiff responds by complaining that 
IQS has refused to respond to Plaintiff’s discovery. This argument is irrelevant, since Plaintiff 
does not explain how it needs discovery from Defendants in order to identify with particularity 
its own trade secrets . . . .”). See also Graves & Range, Identification, supra note 55, at 73 (the 
defendant’s records are most relevant to the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s trade secrets).  
 93. See Lemley, IP Rights, supra note 36, at 342 (the UTSA definition of trade secret 
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only can the UTSA definition of trade secret be read to require 
identification of allegedly misappropriated trade secrets prior to 
discovery with respect to misappropriation,94 a trade secret must exist 
for misappropriation to be actionable95 and for a remedy for 
misappropriation to be available.96 Identification of allegedly 
misappropriated trade secrets when requested by the defendant justifies 
the initiation and maintenance of UTSA litigation.  
Procedural rules protecting defendants from unreasonable pretrial 
discovery also support defendant requests for identification of 
allegedly misappropriated trade secrets early in the discovery process. 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)(1)(G), which authorizes orders 
protecting a party from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or 
undue burden or expense by requiring “that a trade secret…only be 
revealed in a specified way”97 was held by the Vesta federal district 
judge to justify the requested orders.98 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
16(c)(2)(L)99 similarly gives a federal district judge broad discretion to 
adopt special procedures in pretrial conferences. In Porous Media 
Corp. v. Midland Brake, Inc.,100 a pretrial scheduling order required the 
plaintiff to provide a list of its trade secrets to each defendant.101 A 
federal magistrate subsequently granted the defendants’ motion to 
require the plaintiff to amplify its initial disclosures with the 
observation:  
																																								 																				
“prevents plaintiffs from ignoring or glossing over proof of the existence of a trade secret….”). 
 94. See IDX Sys., 2015 WL 9269758 at 2-3, (“Implicit in this definition [of trade secret in 
the Wisconsin enactment] is the requirement that plaintiff particularize the information that it 
seeks to protect.”); AAR Mfg., Inc. v. Matrix Composites, Inc., 98 So.3d 186, 187 (5th Dist. Fla. 
App. 2012) (per curiam) (“In trade secret misappropriation cases, a plaintiff is required to identify 
with reasonable particularity the trade secrets at issue before proceeding with discovery”), pet. for 
review den. (mem.), 130 So.3d 691 (Fla. 2013) (Florida enactment). The IDX trial court decision 
was not influenced by the Wisconsin non-uniform amendment requiring greater identification of 
a trade secret in conjunction with a request for an injunction or a restraining order. See IDX Sys., 
165 F. Supp. 2d at 816-17. For discussion of the Wisconsin non-uniform amendment, see supra 
note  56.  
 95. Refer to supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text. 
 96. Refer to supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 97. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 26(c)(1)(G). 
 98. Vesta, 147 F. Supp. 3d at 1150-51, 1153-54. In Engelhard Corp. v. Savin Corp., 505 
A.2d 30, 32-3 (Del. Ch. 1986), a Delaware Vice-Chancellor relied upon a comparable Delaware 
state court rule to require the plaintiff to file a Trade Secret Statement and to allow the defendant 
thirty days from service and filing of the Trade Secret Statement to respond to the plaintiff’s 
pending discovery requests. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(c)(2)(L) regularly has been 
invoked in this manner. See generally Dean W. Amburn, Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, Trade 
Secret Case Strategies, and ESI Issues in IP Litigation, 2012 WL 1670118 at *11 (2012). 
 99. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 16(c)(2)(L). 
 100. Porous Media Corp. v. Midland Brake Inc., 187 F.R.D. 598 (D. Minn. 1999) (federal 
magistrate). 
 101. Id. at 599. 
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The orderly disposition of cases involving claims of misappropriation of 
trade secrets cannot permit a situation where the details concerning the 
claimed trade secrets are not disclosed at an early date in the litigation. 
Adequate discovery cannot be conducted in the absence of the specific 
disclosure which is required by this Order.102 
In United Services Automobile Ass’n v. Mitek Systems, Inc.,103 a federal 
magistrate granted the defendant’s motion to compel the plaintiff to 
identify its allegedly misappropriated trade secrets before seeking 
discovery with respect to misappropriation, referring to Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 16(c)(2)(L) as the source of the  discretion to do 
so.104 A motion in limine105 to exclude evidence of unidentified trade 
secrets also has been considered to warrant a federal district judge’s 
order that the plaintiff submit “a specific, clear, detailed, and precise 
list of the trade secrets at issue.”106 The rationales for these special 
discovery orders include the purposes of the special California  statute 
that have been emphasized by the California courts; namely assisting 
the court in setting boundaries for discovery and giving the defendant 
notice of the charges early in the case.107 State procedural rules likewise 
have been considered to enable the defendant to require the plaintiff to 
identify allegedly misappropriated trade secrets early in the discovery 
process.108 
																																								 																				
 102. Id. at 600. 
 103. United Services Automobile Ass’n, 289 F.R.D at 244.                                      
 104. Id. at 248-49. A pretrial scheduling order did not require identification of trade secrets 
in Mitek.  
 105. A motion in limine is a motion to exclude evidence. Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 
38, 40 n.2, 41 n.4 (1984) (“We use the term in a broad sense to refer to any motion, whether made 
before or during trial, to exclude prejudicial evidence before the evidence is actually offered.”). 
The Federal Rules of Evidence do not explicitly authorize motions in limine. They are based upon 
a federal district court’s inherent authority to manage trials.  
 106. Cardiovention, Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., 483 F. Supp. 2d 830, 844 (D. Minn. 2007). See 
also MBL (USA) Corp. v. Diekman, 112 Ill. App. 3d 229, 240 (1st Dist. 1983) (“Finally, plaintiff 
contends that the trial court abused its discretion in granting defendant’s motion in limine. We 
cannot agree. Defendant’s motion in limine requested that the trial court require plaintiff to 
establish a prima facie case of misuse of, and the existence of, a trade secret before allowing 
plaintiff to question defendant as to his current methods, techniques and processes.”).  
 107. Compare supra notes  66-67 and accompanying text with the authority in supra notes  
97-106. The Vesta case also mentioned preventing the plaintiff from using discovery as a fishing 
expedition to discover the defendant’s trade secrets and preventing the plaintiff from molding its 
claims to what it discovered. Vesta, 147 F. Supp. 3d at 1153-54. 
 108. See, e.g., Tucson Embedded Sys., 2016 WL 1408347 at *7 (unpublished) (the Arizona 
discovery process includes the issue addressed by the special California  statute); Engelhard Corp. 
v. Savin Corp., 505 A.2d 30, 32-3 (Del. Ch. 1986) (Delaware state court rules required the plaintiff 
to file a Trade Secret Statement and allowed the defendant 30 days from service and filing of the 
Trade Secret Statement to respond to the plaintiff’s pending discovery requests); DSM Dyneema, 
LLC v. Thagard, No. 13-1686, 2014 WL 531770 at *3-6 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 17, 2014) 
(unpublished) (“The Court finds the reasoning [of the] cases requiring pre-discovery disclosure 
of trade secrets persuasive . . . .”).  
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c. Arguments Against Early Disclosure of Trade 
Secrets 
James Pooley opposes requiring a plaintiff initially to provide 
more than a general description of allegedly misappropriated trade 
secrets.109 He believes that emphasis upon early identification has been 
“unduly influenced by the property view of trade secrets . . . .”110 
Pooley argues for a “flexible approach”111 that is inconsistent with the 
UTSA requirements that a trade secret must exist for misappropriation 
to exist, 112 and for a remedy for misappropriation to be available.113 
Pooley’s  view is more compatible with the Restatement (First) open-
ended definition of trade secret, which can be read to permit inference 
of the existence of a trade secret from the defendant’s improper 
acquisition or disclosure of information.114  Pooley, for example, 
contends: 
Caught in what might appear to be unethical conduct, the defendant 
naturally tries to switch the litigation’s focus to the nature and value of the 
property taken, and away from the nature of his behavior.115 
He also maintains that “process” trade secrets and “combination” 
trade secrets, the former derived from extensive trial and error and the 
latter consisting of a new arrangement of previously- known 
information, are so difficult to identify that broad descriptions should 
suffice.116 Finally, he points out that there can be situations in which a 
defendant former employee either has taken or destroyed all the former 
																																								 																				
 109. POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS, supra note 62, at § 11.02[2] (“[T]hrough the first wave of 
discovery…the plaintiff should be permitted to describe the subject matter in more or less general 
terms.”)  It is unclear whether Mr. Pooley would make an exception for cases in which injunctive 
relief is actively sought. See id. (“[I]t is in connection with injunctive orders that a plaintiff should 
be subjected to the most stringent demands of specificity.”). 
 110. Id. at § 11.02[1]. 
 111. Id. at § 11.02[2][c]. 
 112. Refer to the authority supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text. 
 113. Refer to the authority supra note 40 and accompanying text.  
114.Refer to supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text. 
 115. See POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS, supra note 62, at § 11.02[2]. 
 116. Id. With respect to process trade secrets, Mr. Pooley asserts that the negative trade 
secrets acquired “from a large base of research and development” are protectable but that “a 
plaintiff should not be required to minutely describe each bit of a mountain of data as a condition 
of pursuing a misappropriation claim.”  Mr. Pooley is correct in asserting that a person with a 
functioning process trade secret should not have to describe all its research in order to identify the 
process. But that is because it is unnecessary to do so.                                                                          On 
the other hand, if the plaintiff accuses the defendant of misappropriating particular background 
research, the plaintiff should be both able and required to identify that research. See Graves & 
Range, Identification, supra note 55, at 96 (“[W]here a plaintiff specifically accuses a defendant 
of taking and using one or more items of negative information, we see no policy reason not to 
require that those items also be defined in detail.”).   
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employer’s information about a trade secret and substantial discovery 
is required to identify the information that has been misappropriated.117 
But judges routinely have required identification of process and 
combination trade secrets,118 and, in the atypical situation in which a 
former employee either has taken or has destroyed all the information 
about a trade secret, the plaintiff should be required to identify the 
circumstances giving it exclusive rights in the information and to 
explain why it does not have the information.119 
Another argument against requiring early identification of 
allegedly misappropriated trade secrets is that a plaintiff with numerous 
trade secrets could be unsure which trade secrets have been 
misappropriated prior to obtaining discovery.120 However, a plaintiff 
with numerous trade secrets can be required to identify the trade secrets 
most likely to have been misappropriated.121 After the actual 
																																								 																				
 117. POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS, supra note 62, at § 11.02[2]. Bond v. PolyCycle, Inc., 127 
Md. App. 365, 732 A.2d 970 (Md. Spec. Ct. App. 1999) involved a situation in which a former 
employee had misappropriated all the information about trade secrets. In Bond, a corporate 
president who had helped develop a corporation’s trade secrets resigned after being refused a 
compensation package. In addition to taking copies of computer files and other records pertaining 
to the corporation’s secrets, the former president deleted all references to the trade secrets from 
the corporation’s computers and records. Id. at 369-70. 
 118. E.g., Perlan, 178 Cal. App. 4th at 1352 (special California  statute case) (writ directing 
trial court to accept the plaintiff’s trade secret identification refused; plaintiff had not adequately 
explained its combination of processes); Switch Communications Group v. Ballard, No. 11-
00285, 2012 WL 2342929 at *5 (D. Nev. Jun. 19, 2012) (unpublished) (denying plaintiff’s motion 
to compel and granting defendant’s motion for a protective order until plaintiff specifically 
described “what particular combination of components renders each of its designs novel or 
unique, how the components are combined, and how they operate in unique combination.”). See 
also Miles, Inc. v. Cookson America, Inc., No. 12-310, 1992 WL 136381 at *1 (Del. Ch. Jun. 16, 
1992) (unpublished) (plaintiff had identified its secret processes with reasonable particularity). 
        Because combination trade secrets involve public domain information, they require greater 
rather than less explanation. See Aortech Int’l PLC v. Maguire, Case No. 14-00171, 2016 WL 
6459582 at *1 (D. Utah 2016 Oct. 31, 2016)  (unpublished) (“[B]ecause the information itself is 
not confidential, determining what about the compilation is protected requires more of an 
explanation to make clear the claim and allow the opposing party to conduct meaningful 
discovery.”). 
 119. Graves & Range, Identification, supra note 55, at 96 (“[I]f it were impossible for 
plaintiff to identify the destroyed secret, a court could require identification of the circumstances 
of the alleged creation, destruction, and plaintiff’s ownership in the information.”).  
 120. E.g., Global Advanced Metals USA, Inc. v. Kemet Blue Powder Corp., No. 11-00793, 
2012 WL 3884939 at *6-7 (D. Nev. Sept. 6, 2012) (unpublished) (denying a motion to review a 
federal magistrate’s refusal to order the plaintiff to identify its trade secrets “because of their 
voluminosity”), reconsideration den. on other grounds, No. 11-00793, 2013 WL 1110778 (D. 
Nev. Mar. 11, 2013) (unpublished). 
 121. E.g., DeRubeis v. Witten Technologies, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 676, 681 (N.D. Ga. 2007) 
(“[T]he Court finds that it is appropriate in this case to require Witten to first identify with 
‘reasonable particularity’ those trade secrets that it believes to be at issue . . . . [I]t appears from 
the record that Witten is reasonably aware of the trade secrets that are at issue in this case. Thus, 
this approach will not require Witten to list thousands of trade secrets in order to ensure that its 
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misappropriation has been disclosed by discovery, the trade secrets at 
issue can be altered.122 If necessary to avoid prejudice, the parties can 
be allowed more discovery with respect to any additional trade secrets 
placed in issue.123 
A variation of the there-are-too-many-trade-secrets-to-identify 
argument is the “Catch-22” contention. In DeRubeis v. Witten 
Technologies, Inc.,124 the court described the contention as follows:  
[I]f the trade secret plaintiff is forced to identify the trade secrets at issue 
without knowing which of those trade secrets have been misappropriated, 
it is placed in somewhat of a “Catch-22”:  
Satisfying the requirement of detailed disclosure of the trade secrets 
without knowledge [of] what the defendant is doing can be very 
difficult. If the list is too general, it will encompass material that the 
defendant will be able to show cannot be [a] trade secret. If instead it 
is too specific, it may miss what the defendant is doing.125 
This is a false dichotomy coupled with an erroneous implication 
that a plaintiff with numerous trade secrets necessarily is unfairly 
prejudiced by an identification order. A general description of alleged 
trade secrets is an inadequate response to an order to identify.126 
Moreover, if a specific identification is made in compliance with an 
identification order that subsequent discovery revealed missed what the 
defendant was doing, the plaintiff has good cause to alter the trade 
secrets at issue.127 
																																								 																				
disclosure sufficiently covers the range of trade secrets that might eventually arise.”); Avaya, Inc. 
v. Cisco Sys., Inc., No. 10-5881, 2011 WL 4962817, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 18, 2011) (“Simply naming 
the [203] trade secrets that it possesses (some of which are challenged by Cisco) is insufficient to 
allow intrusive discovery into Cisco’s affairs without first establishing some connection that Cisco 
actually has misappropriated them.”). 
     If a plaintiff has numerous trade secrets, a defendant may have little idea which ones it is 
charged with misappropriating. See Del Monte Fresh Produce, 148 F. Supp. 2d at 1326 (“While 
Del Monte states that there are many trade secrets, it does not provide any guidance as to what 
they may be. If a ‘multitude’ of trade secrets really are at issue in this case, Del Monte cannot 
expect Dr. Funk to embark upon a fishing expedition to ascertain what those secrets are.”)  
 122. See Dura Global Techs., Inc. v. Magna Donnelly Corp., No. 07-10945, 2011 WL 
4527576, at *7-9 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 29, 2011) (in its proposed pretrial order plaintiff allowed to 
identify additional allegedly misappropriated trade secrets disclosed by discovery). 
 123. See id. at *1 (on the defendant’s motion, the parties allowed three additional months of 
discovery after discovery had closed with respect to additional allegedly misappropriated trade 
secrets identified by the plaintiff). 
 124. DeRubeis, 244 F.R.D. at 680. 
 125. Id.  
 126. E.g., Biod, LLC v. Amnio Tech., LLC, No. 13-1670, 2014 WL 3864658 at *6 (D. Ariz. 
Aug. 6, 2014) (“Plaintiffs cannot claim that a method or a process is a trade secret without 
identifying the steps in the process and explaining how those steps make their method or process 
unique.”). 
 127.  See Dura Global Techs., Inc. v. Magna Donnelly Corp., No. 07-10945, 2011 WL 
4527576, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 29, 2011); see DeRubeis, 244 F.R.D. at 680. 
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d. Early Disclosure under the UTSA 
The judicial authority allowing a defendant to require 
identification of allegedly misappropriated trade secrets early in the 
discovery stage of litigation is consistent with UTSA policy. On the 
other hand, the longer that a defendant delays asserting the need for 
identification through an appropriate motion, the less the likelihood 
that a court will respond favorably. Data General Corp. v. Grumman 
Systems Support Corp.,128 for example, involved excessive delay. After 
a more than nine-week jury trial on claims of copyright infringement 
and trade secret misappropriation, the jury awarded damages of 
$27,417,000 for trade secret misappropriation to which the trial judge 
added $9,000,000 for willful misappropriation. The defendant 
thereupon moved for judgment as a matter of law notwithstanding the 
verdict on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to identify sufficiently 
the trade secrets at issue.129 The trial court’s summary rejection of the 
motion,130 was affirmed.131 
Mike’s Train House, Inc. v. Lionel, LLC,132 a Sixth Circuit 
decision, may seem to support Pooley’s view that combination trade 
secrets need not be specifically described. The court stated:  
When material such as design drawings or manuals are trade secrets based 
on a unique combination of both protected and unprotected material, a 
plaintiff should not be obligated to identify which components of the 
protected material is secret. Thus, the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying Lionel’s motion for a new trial on this ground.133 
However, the result in Mike’s Train House is explained by the 
defendant’s failure to raise the identification issue  until after  a jury 
trial had been lost.134 Inadequate identification of allegedly 
misappropriated trade secrets ideally should be raised by the defendant 
early in discovery, and, in any event, during trial on the merits. The 
																																								 																				
 128. Data General Corp. v. Grumman Systems Support Corp., 825 F. Supp. 340 (D. Mass. 
1993), reversed in part on other grounds, 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994); an unrelated issue in Data 
General involving federal court subject-matter jurisdiction of infringement actions with respect 
to unregistered copyrighted works subsequently was abrogated by the United States Supreme 
Court. See Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 159-60 n.2, 168-69 (2010) (the 
copyright registration requirement is not jurisdictional notwithstanding its prior jurisdictional 
treatment). 
 129. Data Gen. Corp., 825 F. Supp. at 358. 
 130. Id. at 358-59.  
 131. Data Gen. Corp., 36 F.3d at 1189-90 (reversing in part on other grounds). 
 132. Mike’s Train House, Inc. v. Lionel, LLC, 472 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 133. Id. at 411. 
 134. Id. at 403 (“After unsuccessfully moving the district court for a new trial and judgment 
as a matter of law, [Lionel] filed the instant appeal challenging [the jury verdict, the district 
court’s] evidentiary decisions, the specificity with which [MTH] identified its ‘trade secrets[.]’”).  
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defense typically is considered irretrievably waived if raised for the 
first time after the conclusion of trial on merits.135 On the other hand, 
if the necessity of identification of a combination trade secret is pressed 
during the discovery stage of litigation, it regularly is sustained.136 
However, if the record demonstrates that the plaintiff has no 
protectable trade secrets whatsoever, the defendant should prevail 
whether or not the defendant has made an identification motion.137 
If a defendant promptly sends interrogatories requiring 
identification of allegedly misappropriated trade secrets and obtains an 
order compelling an adequate response, what sanctions are appropriate 
if the defendant does not comply in good faith? Sanctions have 
included the attorney’s fees and costs incurred by the defendant in 
bringing a motion to compel or a motion for sanctions,138 limitation of 
																																								 																				
 135. See also 3M v. Pribyl, 259 F.3d 587, 595-96 (7th Cir. 2001), which similarly indicated 
that a successful plaintiff’s verdict was not impaired by the plaintiff’s failure to identify the trade 
secrets in the 500-plus pages of the manuals at issue. 3M was followed by the Sixth Circuit’s 
decision in Mike’s Train House, Inc., 472 F.3d at 410-11.  
 136. E.g., Sit-Up, Ltd. v. IAC/InterActiveCorp, No. 05-9292, 2008 WL 463884, at *9 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2008) (“Here Sit-Up has not demonstrated the ‘way in which [the] various 
components fit together as building blocks in order to form the unique whole’ . . . . Therefore, 
defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this claim is granted.”); Switch Commc’n Grp. v. 
Ballard, No. 11-00285, 2012 WL 2342929, at *5 (denying plaintiff’s motion to compel and 
granting Defendant’s motion for a protective order until plaintiff specifically described “what 
particular combination of components renders each of its designs novel or unique, how the 
components are combined, and how they operate in unique combination.”); Biod, LLC v. Amino 
Tech., LLC, No. 13-1670, 2014 WL 3864658 at *6 (D. Ariz. Aug. 6, 2014) (denying plaintiffs’ 
motion to compel discovery and granting defendants’ motion for a protective order until plaintiffs’ 
“explain how the combination of much of what appears to be generally known information can 
constitute a trade secret.”); Graves & Range, Identification, supra note 55, at 77 (“[C]ombination 
claims can fail for a number of reasons, just as individual trade secret claims can, and thus they 
should not provide a shield against identification.”). But see dicta in Dura Global Techs., Inc. v. 
Magna Donnelly Corp., No. 07-10945, 2008 WL 2064516 at *1 (E.D. Mich. May 14, 2008), 
which erroneously describes the Mike’s Train House, Inc. opinion as applicable to combination 
trade secrets in the discovery stage).  
 137. E.g., Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 903-04 (reversal 
of final judgment of misappropriation due to a total absence of protectable trade secrets). 
 138. See Compuware Corp. v. Health Care Serv. Corp., No. 01-0873, 2002 WL 485710, at 
*8 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 1, 2002) (“By waiting until the last minute to make this disclosure, Compuware 
has required Blue Cross to prepare a defense on all fronts and, perhaps, unnecessarily increased 
Blue Cross’ costs. Thus, the Court easily concludes that Compuware should pay not only Blue 
Cross’ fees and expenses in preparing its Motions, but should also pay the $10,000 fine suggested 
by Blue Cross.”). See also Universal Comput. Sys., Inc. v. Dealer Sols., LLC, 183 S.W.3d 741, 
745 (Tx. Ct. App 2005) cert. den., 549 U.S. 1031 (2006) (attorney’s fee sanction imposed with 
respect to second motion to compel); N. Am. Lubricants Co. v. Terry, No. 11-1284, 2011 WL 
5828232, at *6-7 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2011) (attorney’s fees awarded with respect to initial motion 
to compel where the plaintiff’s attorney had failed to confer diligently and in good faith in the 
discovery dispute and also had failed to appear at the hearing on the motion to compel). After 
notice and an opportunity for a hearing, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5) authorizes 
imposition of liability for reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses upon the party or attorney 
whose conduct required a motion to compel that was granted or who made an a motion to compel 
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the admissible evidence to the trade secrets initially described by the 
plaintiff,139 and dismissal with prejudice of claims  involving 
unidentified trade secrets.140 A plaintiff’s failure to comply adequately 
with an order to identify its alleged trade secrets not infrequently also 
has been followed by the grant of the defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment after discovery has closed.141 In Imax Corp. v. Cinema 
Technologies, Inc.,142 for example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants because 
the plaintiff’s failure to identify the precise numerical dimensions and 
tolerances of its projector after being ordered to do so had resulted in a 
																																								 																				
that was denied. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5). 
 139. E.g., Hickory Specialties, Inc. v. Forest Flavors Int’l, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 760, 770-71 
(M.D. Tenn. 1998) (plaintiff estopped from making a supplementary presentation identifying 36 
additional trade secrets after discovery closed); Pixion, Inc. v. Placeware, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 2d 
1233, 1240-42 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (plaintiff cannot supplement a prior trade secret identification 
under the special California  statute in order to defeat a motion for summary judgment); Fast Food 
Gourmet, Inc. v. Little Lady Foods, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 849, 852-54 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (plaintiff 
barred from introducing evidence adding to prior unamended trade secret identification). See also 
Cardiovention, Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., 483 F. Supp. 2d 830, 844 (D. Minn. 2007) (motion to 
exclude evidence of previously unidentified trade secrets appropriate). Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 37(c)(1) provides that unjustified failure to disclose information or to supplement 
information when ordered to do so can result in being barred thereafter from using the 
information. Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 37(c)(1).  
 140. E.g., Compuware, 2002 WL 485710 at *8 (“With respect to the nine software products 
that were not dissected in Compuware’s March 18, 2002 filing, the Court readily concludes that 
dismissal with prejudice is warranted. Compuware has not met its burden of specifically 
identifying the trade secrets of nine of the twelve software products identified in the Complaint.”). 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2) provides that the sanctions for not obeying a discovery 
order can include striking pleadings, and dismissing the action or proceeding in whole or in part. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(iii), (v). 
 141. Before discovery closes, a defendant ordinarily should object to inadequate 
identification through a motion to compel. See, e.g., Charles Schwab & Co. Inc. v. Carter, No. 
04-7071, 2005 WL 2369815 at *11 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2005) (“Defendants could raise any 
shortcoming in Schwab’s interrogatory responses (and any attendant confusion regarding what 
trade secrets are at issue in this case) in a motion to compel, especially since discovery in this case 
has yet to close.”). 
 142. Imax Corp. v. Cinema Technologies, Inc., 152 F. 3d 1161 (9th Cir. 1998); accord CHS 
Inc. v. Petronet, LLC, No. 10-94, 2011 WL 1885465, at *6-8 (D. Minn. May 18, 2011) (granting 
summary judgment to defendants where the plaintiff chose to rely upon its initial identification 
notwithstanding the court’s expressed reservations). See also IDX Sys. V. Epic Sys. Corp., 165 
F. Supp. 2d at 812, 819, 829 (summary judgment for defendants on the basis of lack of specificity 
although plaintiff had not been ordered to provide greater specificity); Sun Media Sys., Inc. v. 
KDSM, LLC, 564 F. Supp. 2d 946, 961-64, 973 (S.D. Iowa) (summary judgment for defendants 
to whose interrogatories requesting identification of trade secrets the plaintiff gave “vague and 
unparticularized responses”), reconsideration den., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (S.D. Iowa 2008); 
Givaudan Fragrances Corp. v. Krivda, No. 08-4409, 2013 WL 5781183, at *5-7 (D.N.J. Oct. 25, 
2013) aff’d, 639 Fed. Appx. 840 (3d Cir. 2016) (granting summary judgment to defendants 
notwithstanding the absence of a prior order compelling disclosure with respect to 582 allegedly 
secret perfumes for which the plaintiff refused to identify both the ingredients and the percentage 
of their quantities).   
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failure to prove the existence of a trade secret.143 If plaintiff bad faith 
is involved, the plaintiff can be ordered to reimburse the defendant’s 
reasonable attorney’s fees in defending an action persisted in144 
notwithstanding the plaintiff’s failure to respond meaningfully to a 
court order to identify its trade secrets.145 
Once a plaintiff identifies its allegedly misappropriated trade 
secrets, persuasive authority requires good cause to change the trade 
secrets initially identified.146 Good cause includes having learned 
through discovery for the first time of different or additional 
misappropriated trade secrets.147 
What are the parameters of a sufficient identification? The burden 
is upon the defendant both to raise the issue and to propound 
																																								 																				
 143. Imax Corp., 152 F.3d at 1166-67.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
 144. See Tradesman Int’l, Inc. v. Black, 724 F.3d 1004, 1016 (7th Cir. 2013) (“A claim is 
made in bad faith when it is initiated in bad faith, maintained in bad faith, or both.”); Optic 
Graphics, Inc. v. Agee, 87 Md. App. 770, 789 (Ct. Special App. 1991) (“[A] trial court has 
inherent power to impose sanctions for continuing an action vexatiously, wantonly or for 
oppressive reasons.”) cert. den., 598 A.2d 465. 
 145. See Automated Packaging Sys., Inc. v. Sharp Packaging, Inc., No. 88-0656, 1989 WL 
223755, at 3 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 17, 1989) (“This court finds that the plaintiff’s motions for 
preliminary injunction were brought in bad faith, and will award the defendants’ reasonable 
attorney fees incurred in their defense of the motions for preliminary injunction . . . .”), aff’d, 892 
F.2d 1050 (7th Cir. 1989). The UTSA authorizes a court to award reasonable attorney’s fees to a 
defendant if a claim of misappropriation has been made in bad faith. UTSA, supra note 3, §4(i). 
Several courts have ruled that bad faith requires both the objective speciousness of a claim of 
misappropriation and an improper motive for maintaining suit. E.g., Dice Corp. v. Bold Techs. 
Ltd., No. 11-13578, 2014 WL 2763618, at *15-17 (E.D. Mich. Jun, 18, 2014) (defendant awarded 
attorney’s fees in defending an action in which the plaintiff failed to prove either the existence of 
a trade secret or misappropriation that had been maintained in order to prevent customer 
defections to the defendant). But see Baker Hughes, Inc. v. S&S Chem., LLC, No. 14-531, 2016 
WL 6155688, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 24, 2016) (“‘Under Michigan law, a plaintiff alleging 
misappropriation of trade secrets is required to identify the trade secrets at issue “clearly 
unambiguously, and with specificity.”  However this degree of particularity is not required at the 
pleading stage. It can occur during discovery.’ . . . Based on Michigan’s pleading standards for 
trade secret claims, the Court cannot say that Plaintiff’s lack of specificity in their second amended 
complaint demonstrates bad faith.”). 
 146. See, e.g., Social Apps, LLC v. Zynga, Inc., No. 11-04910, 2012 WL 2203063, at *5 
(N.D. Cal. Jun. 14, 2012) (granting motion to compel the identification of trade secrets without 
leave to amend); Dura Global Techs., Inc. v. Magna Donnelly Corp., No. 07-10945, 2011 WL 
4527576, at *7-9 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 29, 2011) (plaintiff allowed to add additional misappropriated 
trade secrets disclosed by discovery to its proposed final pretrial order); Vesta, 147 F. Supp. 3d at 
1157 (plaintiff required to show good cause to amend its identification of trade secrets as 
discovery progresses); Storagecraft Tech. Corp. v. Persistent Telecom Sols., Inc., No. 14-76, 2015 
WL 9592517 at *5 (D. Utah Dec. 31, 2015) (“Persistent . . . cannot change the basis for its trade 
secret misappropriation claim merely to avoid summary judgment.”). See generally Graves & 
Range, Identification, supra note 55, at 99 (“Subjecting amendments and alterations to judicial 
review would help prevent the problems that we have experienced in many cases where the 
alleged secrets change repeatedly as the case proceeds, often as the close of discovery nears.”). 
 147. Dura Global Techs., 2011 WL 4527576 at *7-9 (plaintiff allowed to add additional 
misappropriated trade secrets identified through discovery to its proposed final pretrial order). 
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interrogatories that require adequate identification of allegedly 
misappropriated trade secrets.148 It is common for interrogatories to 
request specific and precise identification of the trade secrets 
considered to have been misappropriated.149 Under the UTSA, a 
plaintiff can be required to identify the information that the plaintiff 
considers has actual or potential value, is secret, has been the subject 
of reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy, and has been or will be 
misappropriated.150 The identification should permit meaningful 
comparison with information that is generally known to and readily 
ascertainable by those in in the relevant industry.151 To the extent 
necessary for meaningful identification, there should be an 
accompanying descriptive narrative.152 Any identification that is not 
																																								 																				
 148. In Charles Schwab, 2005 WL 2369815, in conjunction with denying the defendants’ 
motion for summary judgement for failure to identify trade secrets because discovery had not 
closed, the federal district judge observed that the defendants’ interrogatories had been general. 
Id. at *11 (“Schwab aptly notes . . . that Defendants’ interrogatories were not as ‘pointed’ as 
Defendants make them seem . . . . Defendants’ interrogatories do not ask Schwab to isolate the 
information that is trade secret, but rather ask Schwab to lump trade secrets in with other 
proprietary and confidential information.”).  
 149. E.g., Hill v. Best Med. Int’l, Inc., No. 09-1194, 2010 WL 2546023, at *1 (W.D. Pa. 
Jun. 24, 2010) (“Identify with precision and specificity each and every alleged trade secret 
Plaintiff contends Defendant Accuray misappropriated.”). The following  Model interrogatory has 
been proposed: 
Identify with precision and specificity each and every alleged trade secret [Plaintiff] 
contends that [Defendant] misappropriated. “Identify with precision and specificity each 
and every trade secret” as used herein means to provide a specific description of each such 
alleged trade secret, on an individual basis for each such alleged trade secret, in such a 
manner that the exact identity, scope, boundaries, constitutive elements, and content of each 
such alleged trade secret are fully disclosed in writing, including any asserted combinations 
. . . . Plaintiff should not rely on any vague or conclusory phrases that do not separately list 
and describe each such alleged trade secret. 
Graves & Range, Identification, supra note 55, at 99. 
 150. UTSA, supra note 3, § 4(i). For a remedy for misappropriation to be available under 
the UTSA, there must be actual or threatened misappropriation of a trade secret. Id. 
 151. Restatement (First), supra note 12, at 5. See IDX Sys., 165 F. Supp. 2d at 812, 817 
(“[T]he description must be specific enough to allow the meaningful comparison of the putative 
trade secret with information that is generally known and ascertainable in the relevant field or 
industry.”); Dow Chem. Can., Inc. v. HRD Corp., 909 F. Supp. 2d  340, 346 (D. Del. 2012) 
(“[I]dentification must be particular enough as to separate the trade secret from matters of general 
knowledge in the trade or of special knowledge of persons skilled in the trade.”), aff’d, 507 Fed. 
Appx. 741 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. den., 135 Sup. Ct. 1539 (2015); MSCI, Inc. v. Jacob, 36 Misc.3d 
211, 212, 945 N.Y.S.2d 863, 864 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 2012) (“The court ordered plaintiffs to 
supplement their responses to defendants’ interrogatories by providing a list of source code 
components: (i) that are covered by third party licenses; (ii) are in the public domain; or (iii) over 
which plaintiffs do not claim trade secret status.”). Actual proof that the identified information 
has value, is secret, and has been the subject of reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy is not 
necessary until after discovery has closed. UTSA, supra note 3, § 4(i). 
 152. See Babcock Power, Inc. v. Kapsalis, No. 13-717, 2015 WL 9244487, at *6 (W.D. Ky. 
Dec. 17, 2015) (unpublished) (“[P]laintiffs shall provide, by January 5, 2016, a full and complete 
description, in narrative form, of the specific trade secrets that they claim are at issue, plaintiffs 
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marked “confidential” and  subject to a non-disclosure order should be 
suspect.153 
III.  FEDERAL TRADE SECRET LEGISLATION 
A. The Economic Espionage Act 
On October 11, 1996, President Clinton signed the Economic 
Espionage Act (EEA),154 the first significant federal statute specifically 
criminalizing trade secret theft.155 The EEA is a combination of two 
bills, one dealing with economic espionage intended to benefit foreign 
governments, foreign instrumentalities, or foreign agents156 and the 
other dealing with trade secret theft affecting interstate or foreign 
commerce.157 Both bills initially referred to “proprietary economic 
information,”158 with a definition modeled upon the UTSA definition 
of trade secret.159 The enacted statute applies to both economic 
espionage involving “trade secrets” and theft of “trade secrets.”160 
Section 1831, the economic espionage provision, requires that an actor 
either intend or know that the offense “will benefit a foreign 
government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent.”161 Section 
1832, the trade secret theft provision, requires an intent to convert a 
trade secret related to a product or service used in, or intended for use 
in, interstate or foreign commerce to the economic benefit of a person 
																																								 																				
must also identify which specific documents constitute those trade secrets.”). Combination trade 
secrets are especially likely to require descriptive narrative. Refer to the authority in  supra note  
118. See also Stoncor Group, Inc. v. Campton, No. 05-1225, 2006 WL 314336, at *2 (W.D. Wash. 
Feb. 7, 2006) (unpublished) (“‘StonCor’s response to interrogatory 11…identified the trade 
secrets that are at issue in this case:  StonCor’s installer network and list, its pricing strategies and 
policies, and its customer lists among other things.’….Defendants are entitled to discovery related 
to all of the so-called ‘other things’ allegedly misappropriated.”). 
 153. L-3 Communications Corp. v. Jaxon Engineering & Maintenance, Inc., No. 10-02868, 
2011 WL 10858409 at *3 (D. Colo. Oct. 12, 2011) (“[T]he fact that all of the Plaintiff’s 
discussions of its trade secrets have occurred in the public portions of the record further suggests 
that Plaintiffs have failed to disclose their trade secrets with reasonable particularity.”). See also 
Graves & Range, Identification, supra note 55, at 91 (“No plaintiff making a good faith 
identification would disclose its alleged trade secrets in a non-confidential document.”). 
 154. Economic Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (as amended 2016). 
 155. POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS,  supra note  62, §13.03. 
 156. S.1557, 104th CONG. (1996) (proposing the Economic Security Act of 1996). 
 157. S. REP. NO. 104-359, at 4-5 (1996) (discussing S.1556 proposing the Industrial 
Espionage Act of 1996). 
 158. Id. at 3 (discussing S.1556). S.1557, the proposed Economic Security Act of 1996, 
added “vital” to the phrase. S.1557, §901(4), 104th CONG. § 901(4) (1996) (definition of “vital 
proprietary economic information.”). 
 159. Id. at 14 (“This definition is closely modeled on the definition of a ‘trade secret’ in the 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act.”). 
 160. Economic Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. §§1831(a) & 1832(a) (West 2012). 
 161. 18 U.S.C. §1831(a) (preamble). 
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other than its owner either intending or knowing that the trade secret 
owner will be injured.162 
The criminal penalties are severe. Violation of Section 1831, the 
economic espionage provision, can subject an individual to a fine of up 
to $5,000,000 or 15 years imprisonment, or both,163 and an organization 
to a fine of the greater of $10,000,000 or three times the value of the 
stolen trade secret to the defendant organization, including costs 
saved.164 Violation of Section 1832, the trade secret theft provision, can 
subject an individual to a maximum fine of up to two times the gross 
gain from the offense, or up to two times the gross loss from the 
offense, or $250,000, whichever is greater, or imprisonment for up to 
ten years, or both fine and imprisonment.165  An organization can be 
fined the greater of $5,000,000 or three times the value of the stolen 
trade secret to the organization, including costs saved.166 
Attempts and conspiracies to violate both provisions have the 
same penalties as full-blown violations.167 Yet a defendant can be 
convicted of an attempt or a conspiracy based upon evidence that the 
defendant believed that information was a trade secret. The United 
States need not prove that a statutory trade secret actually existed.168 In 
addition, the property involved in and derived from misappropriation 
is subject to forfeiture,169 and a convicted defendant must pay 
restitution to the victim.170 
Both provisions share a definition of “trade secret” based on the 
UTSA:  
all forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, 
or engineering information, including patterns, plans, compilations, 
program devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, methods, techniques, 
processes, procedures, programs, or codes, whether tangible or intangible,  
and whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized physically, 
																																								 																				
 162. 18 U.S.C. §1832(a) (preamble). 
 163. 18 U.S.C. §1831(a). 
 164. 18 U.S.C. §1831(b). 
 165. 18 U.S.C. §1832(a). Because the EEA does not specify the maximum fine for 
individual violators, the general felony maximum applies. 18 U.S.C. §3571(b) (3) (West 2012). 
An individual can be fined a maximum of either two times the gross gain or two times the gross 
loss caused by the offense, or $250,000, whichever is larger. 18 U.S.C. §3571(b) (2)-(3), (d).  
 166. 18 U.S.C. §1832(b) (as amended 2016) (as amended by the Defend Trade Secrets Act). 
 167. See 18 U.S.C. §1831(a) (4)-(5); 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (4)-(5) (West 2012). 
 168. E.g., United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 204 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[P]roof that the 
defendants sought to steal actual trade secrets is not an element of the crimes of attempt or 
conspiracy under the EEA.”). See also United States v. Hsu, 40 F. Supp. 2d 623, 630-31 (E.D. Pa. 
1999) (denying a motion to dismiss an EEA indictment due to the vagueness of the EEA definition 
of trade secret because the defendant was charged only with attempt and conspiracy). 
 169. 18 U.S.C. §1834;  & 18 U.S.C. § 2323(a)(1). 
 170. 18 U.S.C. § 2323(c); 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1).  
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electronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing if.. 
(A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such 
information secret; and  
(B) the information derives independent economic value, actual or 
potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily 
ascertainable through proper means by, another person who can obtain 
economic value from the disclosure or use of the information . . . .171 
The EEA’s illustrative list172 of the forms and types of information 
that can be a trade secret is more elaborate than the UTSA’s illustrative 
list but that is not a substantive difference.173 Nor is the EEA’s express 
reference to “intangible” trade secrets and “whether or how” 
memorialized a departure from the UTSA. Deliberately memorizing a 
trade secret that has not been memorialized physically is actionable 
																																								 																				
 171. 18 U.S.C. §1839(3) (as amended 2016) (as amended by the Defend Trade Secrets Act); 
H.R. REP. NO. 104-788, at 12 (1996) (“The definition of ‘trade secret’ is based largely on the 
definition of that term in the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.”). As intended, the 2016 amendment 
brought the EEA definition into greater conformity with the UTSA, which refers to trade secrets 
as information not generally known to, and not readily ascertainable by proper means by, “persons 
who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use.”  UTSA, supra note 3, §1(4), at 538. 
Both the Senate and the House Judiciary Committee Reports on the Defend Trade Secrets Act 
state: 
The intent of Section 2(b)(1)(A)—striking “the public” and inserting “another person who 
can obtain economic value from the disclosure or use of the information”—is to bring the 
Federal definition of a trade secret in conformity with the definition used in the Uniform 
Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”). 
S. REP. 114-220, at 10 (2016); H. REP. 114-529, at 13 (2016).  
     Prior to the amendment, the test for secrecy was whether information was  generally known to 
or readily ascertainable by “the public.” 18 U.S.C. §1839(3) (2012). The federal courts discussed 
in dicta whether this was a marked departure from the UTSA but never definitively resolved the 
issue. In United States v. Lange, for example, Judge Easterbrook commented:  
A problem with using the general public as the reference group for identifying a trade secret 
is that many things unknown to the public at large are well known to engineers, scientists 
and others whose intellectual property the Economic Espionage act was enacted to 
protect….Section 1839(3) (B) replaces “persons who can obtain economic value from its 
disclosure or use” with “the public.”  United States v. Lange, 312 F.3d 263 (7th Cir. 2002). 
The prosecutor believes that the substitution supports the conclusion that Congress referred 
to the general public. Yet one could say instead that “the public” is shorthand for the longer 
phrase, which then would be read as “the economically relevant public”- that is, the persons 
whose ignorance of the information is the source of its economic value. 
Id. (dicta). 
 172. H.R. REP. NO. 104-788 at 12 (“These general categories of information are included in 
the definition of trade secret for illustrative purposes and should not be read to limit the definition 
of trade secret. It is the Committee’s intent that this definition be read broadly.”). 
 173. James H.A. Pooley, Mark A. Lemley, & Peter J. Toren, Understanding the Economic 
Espionage Act of 1996, 5 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 177, 189 (1997) (“Because of the expansive 
interpretation already given to the UTSA definition, the EEA will probably apply to the same 
types of information….”).  
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under the UTSA.174 In Ed Nowogroski Insurance, Inc. v. Rucker,175 a 
Supreme Court of Washington En Banc decision, the court, for 
example, stated: 
The form of information, whether written or memorized, is immaterial 
under the . . . Uniform Trade Secrets Act [which] makes no distinction about 
the form of trade secrets. Whether the information is on a CD, a blueprint, 
a film, a recording, a hard paper copy or memorized by the employee, the 
inquiry is whether it meets the definition of trade secret under the Act and 
whether it was misappropriated.176 
Notwithstanding its expansive language and severe criminal 
penalties, the EEA has been sparingly invoked by the U.S. Justice 
Department. A 2012 analysis of enforcement actions reported 
approximately 124 prosecutions in the sixteen years since enactment, 
an average of less than eight a year.177 Prosecutions had occurred in 
less than 45% of federal judicial districts.178 Less than 10% of the 
prosecutions involved economic espionage. More than 90% involved 
trade secret theft.179 
The sparse number of annual prosecutions suggested that the EEA 
had not been a major deterrent to trade secret theft.180 This, plus 
evidence that serious trade secret misappropriation was occurring181 
resulted in Congressional enactment and President Obama’s signing on 
May 11, 2016 of the DTSA. The new federal statute amended the EEA, 
																																								 																				
 174. RESTATEMENT OF EMP. LAW, supra note 27, § 8.02, Reporters’ Notes to comment g. 
at 421 (“[M]ore than 40 states have adopted the UTSA in a substantially similar form and the 
majority position is that memorized information can be the basis for a trade-secret claim.”). 
 175. Ed Nowogroski Insurance, Inc. v. Rucker, 137 Wash.2d 427 (1999) (en banc) 
(Washington enactment). 
 176. Id. 137 Wash.2d at 449 (Washington enactment); accord, Al Minor & Assoc. v. Martin, 
117 Ohio St. 3d 58, 64 (2008) (Ohio enactment) (“[I]nformation …is protected by the UTSA, 
regardless of the manner, mode, or form in which it is stored—whether on paper, in a computer, 
in one’s memory, or in any other medium.”); see also Stampede Tool Warehouse, Inc. v. May, 
272 Ill. App. 3d 580, 590 (1st. Dist.), appeal den., 163 Ill.2d 589 (1995) (table) (Illinois 
enactment) (“[M]emorization is one method of misappropriation.”).   
 177. Peter J. Toren, An Analysis of Economic Espionage Act Prosecutions, 84 BNA PAT., 
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 884 (2012) [hereinafter cited as Toren, EEA].  
 178. Id. at 886. 
 179. Id. at 886-87. 
 180. Id. at 886 (“[E]nhancing the certainty of punishment produces a stronger deterrent 
effect than enhancing the severity of the punishment.”).  
 181. See, e.g., H. REP.114-529, at 3 (2016) (“Trade secrets are an integral part of a 
company’s competitive advantage in today’s economy, and with the increased digitization of 
critical data and increased global trade, this information is highly susceptible to theft . . . . General 
Keith Alexander, former head of the National Security Agency and U.S. Cyber Command, 
estimated that U.S. companies lose $250 billion per year due to the theft of their intellectual 
property.”).  
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most importantly182 by adding a federal private civil remedy,183 and by 
changing the EEA definition of trade secret.184 
B. The Defend Trade Secrets Act 
The centerpiece of the DTSA is the creation of a federal private 
civil action for trade secret misappropriation involving a product or a 
service related to interstate or foreign commerce: 
An owner of a trade secret that is misappropriated may bring a civil action 
under this subsection if the trade secret is related to a product or service 
used in, or intended for use in, interstate or foreign commerce.185 
Most of the federal private remedies for trade secret 
misappropriation are derived from the UTSA.186 However, in 
																																								 																				
 182. The Defend Trade Secrets Act also includes provisions: (1) increasing the maximum 
fine for an organization engaged in criminal trade secret theft; (2) creating  civil and criminal 
immunity for individuals who confidentially disclose a trade secret to a governmental unit or to 
an attorney solely for the purpose of reporting or investigating a violation of law or in court and 
under seal in defending against an employer lawsuit for reporting a suspected violation of law; 
(3) adding criminal economic espionage and criminal trade secret theft to the predicate acts for 
RICO violations; (4) requiring the U.S. Attorney General to report to the U.S. House and Senate 
Judiciary Committees and to make public not later than one year after the date of enactment and 
biannually thereafter recommendations with respect to the theft of trade secrets from U.S. 
companies outside the U.S., including the protections afforded by U.S. trading partners and 
progress under trade agreements and treaties dealing with the problem; and (5) requiring  the 
Federal Judicial Center to recommend to the U.S. House and Senate Judiciary Committees not 
later than two years after the date of enactment and thereafter from time to time best practices for 
the seizure of information and media storing it, and for the securing  of media after seizure. PUB. 
L. 114-153, §§ 3-4, 6-7 (2016). 
 183. 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b) (2012) (amended 2016). The existence of this new federal civil 
remedy may result in even fewer EEA criminal prosecutions. U.S. Attorney prosecution 
guidelines disfavor prosecuting cases in which the victim has a meaningful civil remedy. Toren, 
EEA, supra note 177, at 886.  
 184. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B) (2012) (amended 2016). This amendment conformed the EEA 
definition of trade secret to the UTSA definition by requiring that a trade secret derive economic 
value from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, 
persons who can derive economic value from its disclosure or use. Refer to supra note  22 and 
accompanying text.  
 185. 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(1). The phrasing of the interstate or foreign commerce nexus for 
federal court jurisdiction is identical to that in the EEA criminal trade secret theft provision. Refer 
to supra note 162 and accompanying text. See S. REP. 114-220, at 5 (2016); H.R. REP. NO. 114-
529, at 9 (2016) (“This jurisdictional nexus to interstate or foreign commerce language is identical 
to the existing language required for Federal jurisdiction over the criminal theft of a trade secret 
under § 1832(a).”). 
 186. See 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3) (regarding injunctive relief, damages, and, in the event of 
willful and malicious misappropriation, exemplary damages, plus a successful plaintiff’s 
reasonable attorney’s fees. Reasonable attorney’s fees also can be awarded if a claim of 
misappropriation is made in bad faith or a motion to terminate an injunction is either made or 
opposed in bad faith). The injunctive and damage provisions are “drawn directly” from the UTSA, 
and the exemplary damage and attorney’s fee provisions are “similar to” and “modeled on” the 
UTSA. S. REP. 114-220, at 8-9 (2016); H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, at 12-13 (2016).  
     A special limitation, which was intended to protect employee mobility, states that the terms of 
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extraordinary circumstances, the DTSA also authorizes ex parte 
application for court-ordered seizure of property in order to prevent the 
propagation or dissemination of a trade secret.187 Among the statutory 
safeguards against abuse of this extraordinary remedy188 are the 
requirement of an affidavit or a verified complaint and court findings 
that it clearly appears from specific facts that: (1) equitable relief would 
be inadequate because the party against whom seizure is ordered would 
evade, avoid, or otherwise not comply with it; (2) immediate and 
irreparable injury would occur if seizure is not ordered; (3) the harm to 
the applicant from denying the application would outweigh the harm to 
the legitimate interests of the person against whom seizure is ordered 
and substantially outweigh the harm to third parties; (4) the applicant 
is likely to succeed in showing that the information at issue is a trade 
secret that the person against whom seizure is ordered either 
misappropriated by improper means or conspired to use improper 
means to misappropriate; (5) the person against whom seizure is 
ordered has actual possession of the trade secret and the other property 
to be seized; (6) the application describes with reasonable particularity 
the matter to be seized, and, to the extent reasonable, its location; (7) if 
prior notice were given, the person against whom seizure is ordered or 
confederates would destroy, move, hide, or otherwise make 
inaccessible the property to be seized; and (8) the applicant has not 
publicized the requested seizure,189 as publication could signify 
																																								 																				
an injunction shall not: 
(I) prevent a person from entering into an employment relationship, and that conditions 
placed on such employment shall be based on evidence of threatened misappropriation and 
not merely on the information that the person knows; or otherwise conflict with an 
applicable State law prohibiting restraints on the practice of a lawful profession, trade, or 
business. 
18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i).  
 187. Id. § 1836(b)(2). A less dramatic distinction from the UTSA is the DTSA’s application 
to continuing misappropriation that began before its effective date. The DTSA applies to a 
continuing misappropriation that recurs after its May 11, 2016 effective date. Adams Arms. LLC 
v. Unified Weapon Systems, Inc., No. 16-1503, 2016 WL 5391394, at *5-7 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 27, 
2016) (unpublished). The UTSA, on the other hand, specifically excludes coverage of a 
continuing misappropriation that began before its effective date in an enacting state. Id.  
 188. In commenting upon the version of the ex parte seizure provision that appeared in the 
2015 bill proposing the Defend Trade Secrets Act, Professor Eric Goldman concluded:  
Given the unique attributes of trade secrets that make plaintiffs’ self-serving statements 
impossible for judges to evaluate independently, additional procedural mechanisms are not 
enough to reduce the risk of errors . . . . [I]t would make sense to strip the Seizure Provision 
from the Act . . . . 
Eric Goldman, Ex Parte Seizures and the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
ONLINE 284, 307 (2015). 
 189. Id. § 1836(b)(2)(A). In OOO Brunswick Rail Management v. Sultanov, No. 17-00017. 
2017 WL 67119 at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2017), a federal district court denied an ex parte 
application for seizure of a defendant’s company-issued laptop and mobile phone under the DTSA 
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improper motivation. The court can require the applicant to provide 
adequate security for resulting liability.190 A hearing upon the propriety 
of an ex parte seizure at which the applicant has the burden of proof 
ordinarily is to be held no later than seven days after the order is 
issued,191 and a person harmed by the order can move for its dissolution 
or modification at any time.192 Damage liability is imposed for 
wrongful or excessive seizure.193 All seized material is to be taken into 
the custody of the court.194   
The DTSA defines “misappropriation” for purposes of the federal 
private civil action in accord with the UTSA.195 The broader EEA tests 
for criminal economic espionage and criminal trade secret theft were 
not used.196 
The new federal private civil action for trade secret 
misappropriation generally does not preempt state law, including the 
UTSA.197 Federal courts have federal question jurisdiction of actions 
under the federal statute,198 and state courts have concurrent 
jurisdiction.199 Federal and state court cases can include claims under 
																																								 																				
because equitable relief ordering the defendant to bring the devices to a scheduled hearing and to 
refrain from accessing or modifying the devices was sufficient.  
 190. Id. § 1836(2)(B)(v)(i). The amount of security required does not limit the damages 
recoverable for wrongful or excessive seizure. Id. § 1836(b)(2)(G). 
 191. Id. §§ 1836(b)(2)(B)(v), 1836(b)(2)(F)(i). 
 192. Id. § 1836(b)(2)(F)(iii). 
 193. Id. § 1836(b)(2)(G). 
 194. Id. § 1836(b)(D)(i). 
 195. Id. § 1839(5). Both the Senate and House Judiciary Committee Reports on the Act 
contain the following statement:  
[M]isappropriation is defined identically in all relevant respects to the definition of 
misappropriation in § 1(2) of the UTSA. The Committee intentionally used this established 
definition to make clear that this Act is not intended to alter the balance of current trade 
secret law or alter specific court decisions. 
S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 10 (2016); H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, at 14 (2016).  
 196. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831(a)(1)-(3), 1832(a)(1)-(3). These EEA definitions of wrongful 
conduct are broader than UTSA misappropriation. See Zoe Argento, Killing the Golden Goose: 
The Dangers of Strengthening Domestic Trade Secret Rights in Response to 
Cybermisappropriation, 16 YALE J. L. & TECH. 172, 227 (2014) (“The EEA’s version of 
misappropriation criminalizes many forms of conduct that would be deemed fair competition and 
therefore lawful under the UTSA.”).  
 197. Pub. L. No. 114-153 § 2(f), 130 Stat. 376, 382 (2016) (providing that the federal private 
civil action amendments do not alter 18 U.S.C. § 1838 (2012), which states that the EEA does not 
preempt state civil remedies). A minor exception is Pub. L. No. 114-153 § 7(b), 130 Stat. 376, 
385-86 (2016) (preempting state law inconsistent with the immunity created by the Defend Trade 
Secret Act for confidential disclosure of trade secrets to the government, to an attorney, or in a 
court filing under seal). 
 198. 18 U.S.C. § 1836(c) (federal district courts have original jurisdiction of civil actions 
under the federal Act). 
 199. Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136 (1876) (“[I]f exclusive [federal court] 
jurisdiction be neither express nor implied, the State courts have concurrent jurisdiction [of federal 
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both the federal statute and a state enactment of the UTSA.200  
However, suing under the federal statute alone does  not permit a 
plaintiff to assert noncontractual state legal claims preempted by the 
applicable state enactment of the UTSA.201 The preemptive effect of 
the UTSA upon other state law is not dependent upon the assertion of 
a UTSA claim.202 
The legislative history of the Defend Trade Secrets Act is replete 
with assertions that the statute will increase the uniformity of American 
trade secret law.203 Because the federal definitions of both “trade 
secret” and “misappropriation” are consistent with the UTSA,204 this 
will occur only if the courts look to well-reasoned decisions under the 
UTSA to construe the federal statute.205   
																																								 																				
claims] whenever, by their own constitution, they are competent to take it.”). See also Tafflin v. 
Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458-460 (1990) (state courts have concurrent jurisdiction of RICO claims). 
However, a defendant sued in state court under the Defend Trade Secrets Act could remove the 
action to federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a)-(b) 
(2012).  
 200. As of September 27, 2016, most of the initial Defend Trade Secrets Act cases were 
filed in federal court but relief seemed primarily to be sought under the companion claim under a 
state enactment of the UTSA. Scott Graham, Errant Email Leads to Conn. Trade Secrets Suit, 
LAW.COM (Sept. 27, 2016), http://bit.do/errant-email-suit (“Like most DTSA cases we’ve seen so 
far, it’s going to be decided under the forum state’s version of the law.”). 
 201. The Official Text of the UTSA preempts duplicative tort, restitutionary, and other non-
contractual law of an enacting state that provides a civil remedy for misappropriation of a trade 
secret. UTSA, supra note 3, § 7(a). Iowa, Nebraska, and New Mexico have omitted the UTSA 
preemption clause and there is split of judicial authority as to its scope in enacting states. The 
majority approach preempts non-contractual legal claims protecting business information, 
whether or not the business information satisfies the UTSA definition of trade secret; whereas the 
minority approach preempts non-contractual legal claims protecting business information only if 
the business information satisfies the UTSA definition of trade secret. See generally Dole, 
Preemption, supra note 21, at 99, 108-10. The minority approach can run afoul of federal patent 
preemption. See generally, Charles Tait Graves & Elizabeth Tippett, UTSA Preemption And The 
Public Domain: How Courts Have Overlooked Patent Preemption of State Law Claims Alleging 
Employee Wrongdoing, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 59 (2012). Federal copyright preemption also limits 
application of the minority approach. See id. at 64 n.4. See also Warren Braunig & Andrea Nill 
Sanchez, What the Defend Trade Secrets Act Means for California (Jul. 13, 2016), 
http://bit.do/DTSAForCA (the Defend Trade Secrets Act should not be construed to resurrect 
common-law tort claims that the California enactment of the UTSA preempted).      
 202. See UTSA, supra note 3, § 7(a); PHA Lighting Design, Inc. v. Kosheluk, No. 1:08-cv-
01208-JOF, 2010 WL 1328754 at 10-11 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 30, 2010) (Georgia enactment  preempted 
unjust enrichment and conversion claims even though there was no claim of trade secret 
misappropriation). 
 203. See, e.g., 162 CONG. REC. S1630 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 2016) (“Our Defend Trade Secrets 
Act creates a single national baseline, or a minimal level of protection, and gives trade secret 
owners access to both a uniform national law and to the reach of the Federal courts[ ]”) (remarks 
of Senator Coons); 162 CONG. REC. H2032 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 2016) (“S. 1890 would provide 
trade secrets owners access to uniform national law and the ability to make their case in Federal 
court.”) (remarks of Rep. Conyers). 
 204. Refer to the authority in supra notes 171 & 195 and accompanying text. 
 205. See Sharon K. Sandeen, The DTSA: The Litigator’s Full-Employment Act, 72 WASH. 
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The legislative history indicates that this is what Congress 
intended.  In addition to proposing legislation that tracked the UTSA 
definitions of trade secret and misappropriation,206 both the Senate and 
House Judiciary Committees issued reports stating that they had no 
intention to alter the result of court decisions under the UTSA:  
While . . . minor differences between the UTSA and the Federal definition 
of a trade secret remain, the Committee does not intend for the definition of 
a trade secret to be meaningfully different from the scope of that definition 
as understood by courts in States that have adopted the UTSA . . . . 
“[M]isappropriation” is defined identically in all relevant respects to the 
definition of misappropriation in §1(2) of the UTSA. The Committee 
intentionally used this established definition to make clear that this Act is 
not intended to alter the balance of current trade secret law or alter specific 
court decisions.207   
With the exception of applications for ex parte seizure orders, the 
Defend Trade Secrets Act does not refer expressly to when allegedly 
misappropriated trade secrets should be identified.208  But the federal 
Act follows the UTSA in making the existence of a trade secret a 
prerequisite to misappropriation and to entitlement to a remedy for 
misappropriation.209 As under the UTSA, misappropriation and the 
availability of a remedy for misappropriation do not exist if there is no 
trade secret.210 It follows that a defendant under the Defend Trade 
																																								 																				
& LEE L. REV. ONLINE 308, 320 (2015) (if the federal courts do not draw upon UTSA precedents, 
the federal Act “will create uncertainty for decades.”). See also David S. Almeling, Four Reasons 
to Enact a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROPER. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 769, 
796 (2009) (“One could argue that an FTSA [federal trade secret act] would, upon passage create 
a vacuum in which there would be no precedent to apply . . . . An FTSA will . . . not create a 
complete vacuum, as courts will be able to incorporate and use UTSA-based precedent.”).                                   
 206. The intent . . . is to bring the Federal definition of a trade secret in conformity with the 
definition in the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”) . . . . [“‘M]isappropriation’ is defined 
identically in all relevant respects to the definition of misappropriation in § 1(2) of the UTSA.”  
S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 10 (2016); H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, at 13-14 (2016). 
 207. S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 10; H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, at 14 (2016). 
 208. The only explicit reference to identification of a trade secret with particularity in the 
statute or its legislative history is with respect to application for an ex parte seizure order. See 18 
U.S.C § 1836(b)(2)(A)(ii)(VI) (amended 2016) (an application must describe “with reasonable 
particularity the matter to be seized”); see also S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 6; H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, 
at 10 (“[I]t is the Committee’s expectation that courts will require applicants to describe the trade 
secret that would be the subject of the order with sufficient particularity so that the court may 
evaluate the request.”). 
 209. See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(5) (amended 2016) (misappropriation is wrongful “acquisition,” 
“disclosure,” or “use” of a “trade secret”); UTSA, supra note 3, § 1(2),  (misappropriation is 
wrongful “acquisition,” “disclosure,” or “use” of a “trade secret”). The Defend Trade Secrets Act 
definition of misappropriation is identical “in all relevant respects” to the UTSA definition. S. 
REP. NO. 114-220, at 10; H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, at 14.  
 210. Refer to the authority supra notes 39 & 40 and accompanying text. 
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Secrets Act should be able to require identification of allegedly 
misappropriated trade secrets early in the discovery process.211 
CONCLUSION 
Both the UTSA and the Defend Trade Secrets Act federal private 
action based upon the UTSA212 are intellectual property statutes 
intended to protect actual trade secrets.213 A defendant should be able 
to obtain an order requiring a plaintiff that can do so to identify the 
allegedly misappropriated trade secrets at issue early in the discovery 
process. A defendant also should be able to obtain a protective order 
excusing response to the plaintiff’s inquiries about trade secrets until 
the plaintiff has complied with the identification order. Greater judicial 
recognition of this will encourage pre-filing investigation of claims, 
facilitate judicial control of discovery, give better notice to defendants 
of the issues in the case, and provide earlier and sharper focus to state 
and federal trade secret litigation.  
 
																																								 																				
 211. Refer to the authority supra notes 86-108 and accompanying text. On the other hand, 
like the UTSA, the DTSA does not require specific identification of alleged trade secrets in the 
pleadings. Mission Measurement Corp. et al. v. Blackbaud, Inc., No. 16-6003, 2016 WL 6277496 
at *5-6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 2016) (denying motion to dismiss both UTSA and DTSA claims for 
lack of specificity). 
 212. Refer to the authority supra notes 171, 186 & 195 and accompanying text. 
 213. The DTSA contains a provision stating that it is not to be construed as a law pertaining 
to intellectual property for purposes of other acts of Congress. Pub. L. No. 114-153, § 2(g), 130 
Stat. at 382. This provision underscores the fact that the Act was based upon the federal power 
over interstate and foreign commerce. Another purpose was to make clear that Internet Service 
Providers, which are subject to federal laws pertaining to intellectual property, stet exempt from 
the Act. See James Pooley, The Myth of the Trade Secret Troll: Why the Defend Trade Secrets 
Act Improves the Protection of Commercial information, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1045, 1065 
(2016). Committee Reports in both Houses of Congress make equally clear that the Act is intended 
to encourage the development of valuable information by protecting trade secret rights from 
misappropriation. S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 3 (“By improving trade secret protection, the Defend 
Trade Secrets Act of 2016 will incentivize future innovation while protecting and encouraging 
the creation of American jobs.”); H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, at 6 (2016) (“This bill will equip 
companies with the additional tools they need to protect their proprietary information, to preserve 
and increase jobs and promote growth in the United States, and to continue to lead the world in 
creating new and innovative products, technologies, and services.”). 
